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BIASED AND BROKEN BODIES OF PROOF: WHITE
HETEROPATRIARCHY, THE GRAND JURY PROCESS,
AND PERFORMANCE ON UNARMED BLACK FLESH
Blanche Bong Cook'
The intention in torture of humans is . . . to silence the other's voice by
wrecking his or her body; it is to make the tortured speak the torturer's words
instead of his own. 2
Margaret A. Farley
ABSTRACT
Although scholars have theorized about systemic racialized police
violence, less attention has been given to systemic practices in the investigations
and grand jury proceedings surrounding cases of excessive police force and black
bodies. This article, focusing on the shooting death of Michael Brown, emphasizes
that it was not just the killing itself, but also the investigation and grand jury
proceeding, which exemplify white heteropatriarchal performance on vulnerable
bodies.'
I Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University School of Law. B.A. Vassar College. J.D.
University of Michigan School of Law. Assistant United States Attorney, 2005-2014, United States,
Department of Justice. I presented an earlier version of this article as the Keynote Speaker for
Vanderbilt Law School Black History Month in February 2015. 1 would like to thank Angela Harris,
Darryl Stewart, Dawn Marcelle, Kristen Barnes, Jonathan Weinberg, Vinay Harpalani, Taja-Nia Y.
Henderson, Stacey Floyd Thomas, Juan Floyd Thomas, Steven Shaviro, Justin Long, Robert Sedler,
Erica Beecher-Monas, and Chris Lund for their helpful comments on previous drafts. I must extend
my sincere gratitude to Tiye Greene, Sharae Smiley, and Phaedra Wainaina, my tireless, loyal,
hardworking, and perspicacious research assistants. Any errors are mine.
2 MARGARET A. FARLEY, JUST LOVE: A FRAMEWORK FOR CHRISTIAN SEXUAL ETHICS 123 (Continuum
International Publishing Group 2010).
3 Throughout this piece, I reference the "black body" in order to underscore the corporeal fleshiness
of human life.
' In describing Michael Brown's death as a white heteropatriarchal performance on vulnerable
bodies, I reference several theorists, most immediately, Anthony Farley's Black Body as Fetish
Object, particularly Professor Farley's argument that black bodies have provided canvasses, stages,
and theater for the formulation and formation of "whiteness." Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Body
as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457, 464 (1997). Farley argues, "The white identity is created and
maintained by decorating black bodies with disdain, over and over again." Id. at 463. "Race is a
form of pleasure in one's body which is achieved through humiliation of the Other and then, as the
last step, through a denial of the entire process." Id. at 464. "The discourse of race involves lavishly
decorating the black body with statistics, stories, and images of violence, narcotics,..." and other
racial tags, labels, and branding. Id. at 475. Whiteness, as an identity, emerges out of this discourse;
for "[i]f the black body is the site and cite of all ills, then the white body is not." Id. Moreover, once
the black body is branded as the site for all ills, it provides carte blanche for policing, surveillance,
and the use of excessive police force because the body and, by extension the "bad" neighborhood,
become an indispensable justification for reasonable suspicion as well as probable cause, both of
which justify intrusion. See id. As developed throughout this piece, this article argues that the
investigation and grand jury proceeding in the case involving Michael Brown and Darren Wilson
served these functions.
UMKC LAW REVIEW
Discourses and ideologies of white heteropatriarchy, manifest as implicit
bias and structural prejudice, frame the way we see evidence, such that the black
body itself becomes proof of criminality and the white body itself reflects
innocence, goodness, and righteousness. Gendered frameworks of blackness and
whiteness not only frame the way we see evidence, they exist before we see the
proof; determine what counts as evidence; determine the presumption of
innocence, as well as guilt; dictate the outcomes of both the investigation and
adjudication; invert the adjudicative process; and reallocate both the order of proof
and the burdens of persuasion in grand jury proceedings as well as trials. When
police officers kill and brutalize unarmed black people, the grand jury proceeding
is inverted, such that prosecutors defend the perpetrators of violence and make the
case for justifiable homicide beyond a reasonable doubt, when they would
normally aggressively prosecute the targets establishing guilt by a probable cause
standard. The unprecedented rates of incarceration making the United States the
most carceral nation in history speak to the unbridled success rate of prosecutorial
zeal when there is a will and a desire to prosecute. In the case of Michael Brown's
killing, however, the failure to obtain an indictment against police officer Darren
Wilson accomplished the same task as the killing of Brown itself, which was the
vilification of Brown, the valorization of Wilson, and the reassurance of white
heteropatriarchal preeminence, vindication, safety, and security. This is
particularly imperative to apprehend when considering potential solutions to the
problem of racialized and gendered operations of law enforcement: grand jury and
court rooms have so far functioned to sanitize, subsidize, and perpetuate the
violence of law enforcement, rather than acting as a corrective to it, even as victims
of police wrong-doing are encouraged to seek relief from the courts. Thus, in
addition to reforms aimed at police officers and methods, substantive changes in
both the investigations and prosecutions of cases involving law enforcement
violence are imperative, with particular attention to the grand jury proceedings.
I. INTRODUCTION & TERMINOLOGY
With 90% or higher success rates,' grand jury proceedings epitomize
prosecutorial discretion, domain, and power. Yet, in the case of Darren Wilson -
and numerous other police officers charged with similar acts of violence -
prosecutors problematically failed to obtain indictments (let alone convictions) for
I See Ben Casselman, It's Incredibly Rare For A Grand Jury To Do What Ferguson's Just Did,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 24, 2014, 9:30 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/ferguson-michael-
brown-indictment-darren-wilson/; see also Philip Bump, The Rarity of a Federal Grand Jury Not
Indicting, Visualized, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2014/11/24/the-rarity-of-a-federal-grand-jury-not-indictingvisualized/http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/11/24/the-rarity-of-a-federal-grand-jury-not-indicting-
visualized/.
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the deaths of unarmed black citizens.6 In questioning the absence of a true bill in
the Wilson grand jury proceeding, many critics, commentators, and legal pundits
suggest that the answer is obvious; however, when asked exactly what is obvious,
responses oscillate. Those on the left of the political spectrum, may ask, "Wasn't
it racism?" However, when hard pressed to carefully delineate what is meant by
"racism," few can explain in detail. For example, few are willing to say that the
mere sight of a black body arouses feelings of suspicion and dangerousness and
stimulates a need to control. As another example, few, if any, have suggested an
intersectional analysis, specifically that if these were black officers killing
unarmed white females, the investigations, grand jury presentations, grand jury
results, possible settlements, framing of the evidence, discourses surrounding the
proof, trials, and/or proposed solutions would be radically different. Those on the
right of the political spectrum, may ask, "Wasn't Brown a thug that deserved it?"
"Wasn't Brown wild and dangerous?" Although the answers may seem obvious, it
is worth unpacking how the institutional power of courts have masked, obfuscated,
and legitimized the operations of white supremacy and heteropatriarchy in these
unarmed killings.' Prosecutors and judges have acted in ways that perpetuate the
violence of law enforcement, when their proper role should be corrective. Law
enforcement has exaggerated the limits of its authority, and both courts and
prosecutors have failed to exercise their power to curb arbitrary violence by the
6 The naming of persons of color, including Blacks and Latinas/os, remains highly contested ground,
with marginalized groups demanding the authority to self-define, self-proclaim, and self-announce.
Thus, it is imperative for me to make several comments at the outset concerning the utility of the
words 'black,' "Black," and African-American. When used as an adjective, I use "black" and
similarly "white." I use 'African-American' and 'Black' interchangeably. When using 'Black,' I
capitalize it to reflect the view that Blacks, like Asian Americans, Latina/os, and other
'underrepresented groups,' constitute specific ethnic and cultural groups. Consequently, this requires
the designation of a proper noun. See Kimberle' Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1331, 1349 (1988); Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda
for Theory, 7 SIGNs: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 515, 516 (1982) (noting that 'Black' is more
than skin color or pigmentation, but as a cultural heritage, a shared experience, a personal and
communal identity, the meaning of which has been deemed synonymous with social stigma).
7 The recent spate of police shootings of unarmed person dwells at the intersections of race as well
as class and gender; however, the thrust of the analysis in the instant piece focuses on race, more
specifically white supremacy, racism, and implicit bias. My scholarship on police violence will
continue to contextualize the killings of vulnerable persons in the larger theoretical framework of
white heteropatriarchy. The use of the term "heteropatriarchy" in this article, therefore, is a place-
marker intended for purposes of continuity with my later work. There are clear gender components
to the recent spate of killings, and racialized understandings of masculinity directly impact those
functions, but I leave to another day an analysis of these shootings with a more nuanced emphasis
on the functions of heteropatriarchy.
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state, even as victims of police wrong-doing are encouraged to seek redress
through the courts.8
The recent spate of unarmed shootings of Blacks, typified in the case of
Michael Brown and Officer Darren Wilson, functions as sites of white and
patriarchal violence on black flesh,9 more specifically, implicit bias concretized as
structural prejudice during the investigation of Officer Wilson. As a former federal
prosecutor with a 100% success rate in obtaining grand jury indictments in over
100 federal cases, the reasons for the absence of a true bill in the Wilson case are
hardly obvious to me or the standard viewer of the American scene.o At least part
of the answer, however, to the absence of a true bill in Wilson's case lies in the
power of white heteropatriarchal ideologies to invert order and to obfuscate, hide,
and legitimize the inversion. These ideologies are manifested with the power and
moral authority to turn an indictment proceeding into a vindication process where
the alleged perpetrators become the victims and the victims, particularly when they
are societally vulnerable, become the villains. Instead of vetting whether Wilson
used excessive force, the proceedings vilified Brown and sanitized Wilson,
inoculating him from charges of criminality and treachery." During Wilson's
grand jury proceedings, the prosecution put on Wilson's case-in-chief, normally
reserved for the defense attorney at trial; this is just one example of several that
demonstrate the inverted process in which prosecutors become defense attorneys,
grand juries become petit juries, defendants become victims, and victims become
villains. Much like rape cases, battered women's cases, sex trafficking cases, and
8 See, e.g., Supreme Court Sides With Police; Officers Using Deadly Force In Chases Granted More
Immunity, LEO AFFAIRS (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.leoaffairs.com/featured/supreme-court-sides-
with-police-officers-using-deadly-force-in-chases-granted-more-immunity/ (explaining the Supreme
Court's acquiescence to police perspectives on violence); Doug Wyllie, How 'Comply and Complain'
Can Prevent a Future Ferguson, POLICEONECOM (Aug. 7, 2015),
https://www.policeone.com/police-trainers/articles/869843 1 -How-comply-and-complain-can-
prevent-a-future-Ferguson/ (instructing victims of police misconduct to "comply and complain").
9 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
1o "A Huffington Post-YouGov poll of 1,000 adults released [in 2014] found that 62 percent of
African-Americans believed Officer Wilson was at fault in the shooting of Mr. Brown, while only
22 percent of whites took that position." Michael Wines, Reaction to Ferguson Decision Shows
Racial Divide Remains Over Views of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/26/us/after-ferguson-announcement-a-racial-divide-remains-
over-views-of-justice.html. Analogously, "[i]n 1992, a Washington Post poll found that 92 percent
of Blacks - and 64 percent of Whites - disagreed with the acquittal of the Los Angeles police
officers involved in the videotaped beating of a black man, Rodney King." Id.
I After conducting an investigation, the Department of Justice found that "Wilson's actions [did]
not constitute prosecutable violations under the applicable federal criminal civil rights statute...."
Memorandum from the Dep't. of Justice on The Criminal Investigation Into The Shooting Death of
Michael Brown By Ferguson, Missouri Police Officer Darren Wilson (Mar. 4, 2015), available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opalpressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj report on
_shootingof michael brown_ .pdf. Although the DOJ made a non-prosecutable finding, its report
did not analyze the procedural irregularities of the Darren Wilson investigation and grand jury
proceeding, which are the subject matters of this article. See id
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other cases involving societally vulnerable victims, the grand jury proceedings
confirmed Wilson's innocence and Brown's villainy. Perhaps too, the absence of
a true bill reassured the public that the tools necessary to promote, privilege, and
protect white innocence and to annihilate black demonry were alive, well, and
resting comfortably within the legal process. 12
The Wilson proceedings paradigmatically exemplify the manner in which
law is intersectionally raced, classed, and gendered, such that black bodies are
relegated to places of vulnerability and saturated with the conditions necessary for
exploitation, domination, and control. Yet the power of law to reify existing social
arrangements and racial hierarchies comes from, among other things, the
procedural performance of fairness and neutrality, such that violence and
inequality appear natural, necessary, inevitable, and beyond reproach. 3 The "no
true bill" vindicated the right of a white officer to shoot and kill a perceived black
threat.
In order to explore the obfuscating, inverting, reassuring properties of the
Wilson no true bill, this article proceeds in eight parts. Part II explains and defines
key terms used throughout the article, including white supremacy and
heteropatriarchy, white heteropatriarchy, implicit bias, and performance. Part III
provides background and contextual information about the facts and circumstances
surrounding Officer Darren Wilson's shooting Michael Brown. Part IV provides
background and contextual information about grand jury proceedings generally.
Part V explores the structural biases and inherent conflict of interests that favor
white police officers accused of killing black people. Part VI uses a set of
multidisciplinary analytical tools to expose the operations of white
heteropatriarchy in the Wilson grand jury proceedings. Part V problematizes the
underlying societal notions that frame the way we see evidence, particularly
implicit bias. Finally, in Part VIII, I argue that a remedy requires measures as
comprehensive and ubiquitous as white heteropatriarchy itself, but more
specifically solutions aimed at the inner workings and dynamics of law
enforcement. I explore efforts, both theoretical and practical, to disrupt the
conflation of white heteropatriarchy with law and order, particularly the use of
implicit bias research to screen law enforcement candidates in the application
process itself.
12 See, e.g., Sunil Dutta, I'm a cop. If You Don't Want To Get Hurt, Don't Challenge Me., WASH.
PosT (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/08/19/im-a-cop-
if-you-dont-want-to-get-hurt-dont-challenge-me/?utm term=.e5f629cb3345; Matthew Vadum,
Michael Brown: A Criminal and a Thug, FRONTPAGE MAG (Aug. 17, 2014), available at
http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpmi/238860/michael-brown-criminal-and-thug-matthew-vadum.
Both of these articles might suggest a victim-blaming approach that reframes the issues in the
Michael Brown/Darren Wilson case as law enforcement needing to use violence to contain [black]
criminality.
13 Crenshaw, supra note 6.
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H. TERMINOLOGY
Before turning to the main body of the essay, it may be helpful to clarify
how and why I use the terms "heteropatriarchy," "white supremacy," and, in
combination, "white heteropatriarchy," as well as to define the terms "implicit
bias" and "performance," which are key to my analysis of the investigation and
grand jury proceedings in the Daren Wilson case.
Heteropatriarchy. Heteropatriarchy is generally defined as a system of
power and control based on compulsory heterosexuality, patriarchy, and imposed
gender-binary systems. In defining the salient characteristics of heteropatriarchy,
Angela Harris emphasizes five "linked assumptions":
First is the assumption that every person is born, and thereafter
remains for life, either male or female. Second, one's sex at birth
is assumed to determine one's gender; biology therefore controls
one's social behavior . . . . Third, sex/gender causes males and
females to be distinctively and dramatically different along
dimensions of appearance, character, behavior, interests, and
innate abilities.... Fourth, because "opposites attract" and sex
differences are complementary, sexual and romantic relationships
should occur only between men and women, not between people
of the same assigned sex . . . . These four linked assumptions
constitute the "hetero" of heteropatriarchy. The fifth assumption
provides the "patriarchy": though male and female are opposite
sexes, they are not quite equal. Masculinity is the privileged
sex/gender. In nearly every setting, as feminists have pointed out,
masculine characteristics and attributes are considered superior to
feminine ones. 14
In the case of Michael Brown and Darren Wilson, it must be pointed out
that both individuals are socially classified as men, and thus constructed to possess
particular traits of masculine character and behavior. As argued infra, expectations
surrounding masculinity and violence played a significant role in the inversion of
Brown's and Wilson's roles as victim and perpetrator respectively.
White Supremacy. The role of gender norms cannot be fully understood,
however, without also considering race. White supremacy refers to a formal system
of racial domination based on the belief that Blacks are inferior and should be
subordinated and made pliable to white desire. White supremacy is a perennial and
omnipresent historical operative that creates a material reality of vulnerability and
degradation for black bodies. This grounding stands in sharp contrast to any claims
of post-racialism. Post racialism represents a fatigue with race and racial
14 Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in A Prison Nation, 37
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 13, 21-22 (2011).
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consciousness. Ignoring race allows for the perpetuation of racialized inequality,
rendering the starting point for change invisible. By grounding my analysis in the
narrative and legacy of white supremacy and the material reality it creates, this
article answers Professor Kimberle' Crenshaw's call "to maintain a contextualized,
specified world view that reflects the experience of Blacks."" In the case of
Michael Brown and Officer Wilson, racial ideologies cleave gender norms, such
that white men take on the ideal traits of masculinity (honor, protection, courage,
etc.), while black men are imbued with the stark opposite qualities, perceived as
crooked, dangerous, aggressive, and in need of being controlled. As other scholars
have noted, black men are hypermasculinized and hypersexualized, and this has
historically contributed to their vulnerability to white violence.' 6
White Heteropatriarchy. "[H]ierarchies of race, class, sexual orientation,
and gender..." all coalesce to delineate groups of women, as well as men, "as
vulnerable to the violence of other men." 7 Although Brown's death and the
legitimization of his killing through the criminal justice system is made explicable
as a function of racial violence, the codes of gender, class, and sexuality also
explain the dynamics leading to his death as well as the grand jury's promotion,
protection, and vindication of white hetero-patriarchal order. When highlighting
the dynamics of power as it is raced, classed, and gendered, white heteropatriarchy
refers to a racialized system of power and control based on compulsory
heterosexuality, patriarchy, and an imposed gender-binary system.
Implicit Bias. Cynthia Lee defines implicit bias as "unintentional bias
arising from 'attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, decision-
making, and behavior, without our even realizing it.""' Implicit bias is the
meaning we attach to objects and bodies in the unfiltered and unregulated mind.
Implicit bias is the nanosecond associations of the black body with suspicion,
dangerousness, and the need to be controlled and the equally immediate pairing of
whiteness with innocence, righteousness, privilege, and the need to be vindicated.
Through the lens of implicit bias, blackness is the evidence of evil and whiteness
is the evidence of innocence. Implicit bias research demonstrates that pathology
perpetually clings to the black body and innocence melds with the white body;
thus, even where the white body is engaged in treachery, it is perceived as innocent
and where the black body is engaged in innocence, it is perennially pathological.
Even when a white police officer murders an unarmed black youth in broad
daylight on a summer day in the middle of a well-traversed public street, implicit
" Crenshaw, supra note 6 (citing Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARv. L. REv. 323 (1987)).
16 See generally Harris, supra note 14; see also ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, AND CLASS 172-
201 (Random House, 1981).
1 Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 779 (2000).
1 Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in A Not Yet Post-Racial
Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1559 n.23 (2013) (citing Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the
Courtroom, 59 UCLAL. REv. 1124, 1126 (2012)).
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bias, which saturates both public and legal discourses, frames the white shooter as
valiant and the black victim as demonic. Some discussions of implicit bias couch
the term in innocent language and understandings, suggesting that it reflects mere
ideas, not action; is lodged in the subconscious, where it cannot be controlled; is
shared with black people (they have implicit bias too); and is reinforced by outside
influence, as opposed to being conscious and willful. In contrast, I argue that
implicit imperatives" inform material reality, not the least of which those where
people get shot.2 o Implicit bias does refer to subconscious ideas, but these ideas
also manifest as actions with consequences; moreover, social and structural
inequality makes the implicit bias of some groups (such as police officers) more
materially dangerous than that of others. Rather than focusing on the unconscious
or non-volitional aspects of implicit bias, I focus on the concretization of implicit
bias in legal structures - something we can and do have more control over.
Investigations of officer-involved shootings, and in particular the grand jury
procedure, should function to challenge and undo the effects of implicit bias, rather
than enshrining such bias in law.2 '
19 STACEY M. FLOYD-THOMAS & JUAN M. FLOYD-THOMAS, THE ALTARS WHERE WE WORSHIP: THE
RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF POPULAR CULTURE (2016).
20 Far from an idea with no consequence in material reality, the omnipresence and entrenchment of
white heteropatriarchy systemically persists in the United States. The poverty rate for non-Hispanic
Whites was 9.6% in 2013 and 27.2% for Blacks in 2013. DeNavas-Walt, Carmen & Bemadette D.
Proctor, Income and Poverty in the United States: 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Current Population
Reports, P60-252, at 12-13 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, Sept. 2015)..
"[M]edian per capita family income for [Blacks and Hispanics] is below 60% of levels for non-
Hispanic Whites ..... Carlos Gradin, Poverty Among Minorities in the United States: Explaining
the Racial Poverty Gap for Blacks and Latinos, 44 Applied Econ. 3793, 3793 (2012). In 2006, Black
unemployment rate was 57% and White unemployment rate was 62%. Id. at 3796. In 2006, 18% of
Blacks went to college and 33% of Whites went to college. Id "Broken down by race, approximately
thirty-three percent of African-American children and thirty percent of Latinalo children live in
poverty compared to only nine percent of white children." Andrea Charlow, Race, Poverty, and
Neglect, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 763, 767-68 (2001). "31 percent of white children - 11.7 million
- live in low-income families; 65 percent of black children - 6.4 million - live in low-income
families." Yang Jiang, Mercedes Ekono, & Curtis Skinner, Basic Facts About Low-Income Children:
Children Under 18 Years, 2013, NAT'L CTR. FOR CHILD. IN POVERTY (2015).
21 It should be noted that there are essentially two threads of argument with respect to the rhetoric
surrounding implicit bias: (1) it is a subconscious association upon which we have no control or (2)
it takes its power from cultural reinforcement and can be mitigated or reversed with conscious effort,
which of necessity, requires awareness. If the first is true, then persons with implicit bias cannot have
authority over persons against whom they have implicit bias. This would include education,
sentencing, and medical treatment, just to name a few areas. Such conclusion is unacceptable.
Instead, making race salient and conscious efforts to reverse the impact of implicit bias training
produces more equitable results. See, e.g., Robert J. Smith, Reducing Racially Disparate Police
Outcomes: Is Implicit Bias Training the Answer?, 37 U. HAw. L. REV. 295, 300-02 (2015). In some
sense implicit bias is a narrative to describe and capture the operations of racism, white supremacy,
and white heteropatriarchy. Implicit bias manifests on a spectrum of microaggressive to
macroaggressive behavior in which the actor is neither unconscious nor laboring under a seizure.
The implicit bias conduct has volition. If it is true, that implicit bias cannot be controlled, then it
follows, that individuals who have implicit bias cannot have power and authority over persons against
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Performance. Finally, I refer to the incidents under discussion, beginning with the
shooting of Brown and stretching to include the investigation, prosecution, and
failure to indict Office Wilson, as a "performance" of white heteropatriarchy. What
does this mean, and how is it helpful for understanding the issues at hand? The
notion of "performance" is crucial to feminist and queer theorizations of gender,
and of gendered power. Specifically, theorists have suggested that gender, rather
than being an essential trait of sexed bodies, is instead made "real" through
repetitive social performance.2 2 Just as the notion of performance is crucial to
understanding lived categories of race and gender, so too is it necessary to
understanding law, which - beyond being a collection of codified rules - draws its
power (and legitimacy) from procedural performance.23 Indeed, the social import
of law comes in large part from its practice rather than from its mere codification.24
"Performance," therefore, describes a set of interrelated and simultaneous
processes: the gendered and racialized performances of masculinity that are crucial
to understanding Wilson's encounter with Brown; the performance of law and
procedure during the investigation and grand jury proceeding; and the ways in
which both sets of performances functioned to reiterate and reify social inequality
as material expression of life and death.
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
On August 9, 2014, in broad daylight on a well-traveled public street,
Darren Wilson, a white police officer, shot and killed Michael Brown, an unarmed
black teen, in Ferguson, Missouri, a suburb of St. Louis. Wilson shot at Brown 12
times,25 emptying his service revolver with the exception of one bullet. From the
outset of the grand jury proceedings, the prosecution laid the foundation for
Wilson's defense. Before the prosecution allowed Wilson to testify and provide
his story to the grand jurors, the prosecution showed the grand jurors a video of
Brown robbing a local convenient store while one of the prosecutors described
Brown as "brash," "threatening," and "intimidating." 26 By contrast, before Wilson
whom they have implicit bias. This may not be acceptable, workable, or practicable. Instead, research
has demonstrated that implicit bias and di-bias training can ameliorate the impact of implicit bias.
See id. It should also be noted that implicit bias may inform the way in which implicit bias is
discussed, identified, and framed. See id.
22 See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 6-7 (Linda J. Nicholson, ed., Routelage 1990).
23 See, e.g., J.M. BALKIN AND SANFORD LEVINSON, Law As Performance, in 2 LAW AND LITERATURE:
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 729 (Michael Freeman & Andrew D. E. Lewis, eds., Oxford Univ. Press,
1999); KENJI YOsuINo, COVERING (Random House, 2006), available at
http://kenjiyoshino.com/KY/covering/.
24 Balkin and Levinson, supra note 22.
25 Rachel Clarke & Mariano Castillo, Michael Brown shooting: What Darren Wilson Told the
Ferguson Grand Jury, CNN, (Nov. 26, 2014, 11:32 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/25/justice/ferguson-grand-jury-documents/.
26 Transcript of Grand Jury, vol. 4 at 84-86, Ferguson Police Shooting, Sept. 10, 2014, available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1 370517-grand-jury-volume-4.html [hereinafter
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testified, the prosecution painted Wilson as easy going, "a good officer," and not
one to "go . . . look[ing] for trouble." At the beginning of Wilson's direct
examination, the prosecution further solidified Wilson's defense, letting Wilson
establish his size - nearly 6-foot-4, weighing around 210 pounds27 and allowing
Wilson to describe Brown as a "demon," 28 "Hulk Hogan," 29 "aggressive," and
from a bad neighborhood, known for violence, guns, gangs, and drugs.30
After establishing the contrasting frames of "good" Wilson and "evil"
Brown," the prosecution gave the grand jurors an erroneous, outdated, and
constitutionally overruled Missouri statute that established a complete defense for
Wilson's use of excessive police force against "evil" Brown.3 2 The Supreme Court
Transcript, vol. 4]; see also Katherine Goldwasser, The Prosecution, the Grand Jury, and the
Decision Not to Charge, in FERGUSON'S FAULT LINES: THE RACE QUAKE THAT ROCKED A NATION
37, 44 (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., ABA Publishing 2016), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmultimedia/cte/materials/2016/05/cel605fss.authche
ckdam.pdf
27 Transcript of Grand Jury, vol. 5 at 198, State v. Wilson, Sept. 16, 2014, available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1370518-grand-jury-volume-5.html [hereinafter
Transcript, vol. 5]. It should also be noted that at the outset of Wilson's direct examination, the
prosecutor asked Wilson if he wanted to be in the grand jury to tell the grand jurors what happened,
to which he responded in the affirmative. Id. at 197-98. The inference here is that Wilson volunteered
his testimony, as opposed to providing it via subpoena, yet another framing of Wilson's testimony in
a manner most beneficial to Wilson's innocence, as opposed to his adjudication. Goldwasser, supra
note 26.
28 Transcript, vol. 5, at 225.
29 Transcript, vol. 5, at 212.
30 Transcript, vol. 5, at 170.
31 Goldwasser, supra note 26.
32 At the outset of the grand jury proceedings, the prosecution read the grand jurors Mo. REV. STAT.
563(3)(2)(a) (1979), a statute analogous to that overruled by the Supreme Court in Tennessee v.
Garner. 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985). In Garner, the Supreme Court struck down a Tennessee statute,
which like the Missouri statute, allowed the police to use deadly force on a fleeing felon where the
suspect was neither armed nor seemingly dangerous. Id. In Garner, the Court held, "Where the
officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either
to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly
force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe
that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical
harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning
has been given." Id. Thus, the statute that the prosecution provided the grand jurors during the outset
of the grand jury proceeding was not only erroneous, it was much more favorable to Wilson. See
also Nicole Flatow, This Mistake Skewed The Law In Darren Wilson's Favor, THINK PROGRESS (NOV.
30 2014), https://thinkprogress.org/this-mistake-skewed-the-law-in-d arren-wilsons-favor-
9374d3fbal7#.fwlilvor6.https://thinkprogress.org/this-mistake-skewed-the-law-in-darren-wilsons-
favor-9374d3fbal7#.fwlilvor6. It should also be noted that, after Garner, the Supreme Court
decided two more cases that govern the terrain of the reasonableness of a police officer's use of
excessive force. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). In
Scott, the Court essentially adopted a totality of the circumstance test finding that what constitutes
an unreasonable seizure of a person, is not susceptible to "an easy-to-apply legal test." Scott, 550
U.S. at 383. According to Justice Scalia, "Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that
triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer's actions constitute 'deadly force."' Id. at 372. In
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had earlier over-ruled an analogous statute in a case it decided years earlier. The
statute the prosecutors provided to the grand jury was not only unconstitutional,
but it was more favorable to Wilson than the governing and applicable law. Two
months after providing the erroneous statute and having allowed that erroneous
statute to frame the grand jurors view of the evidence, the prosecution finally gave
the grand jurors the correct law governing deadly use of police force.3 3
Having set the frame of contrasting images and having provided an
unconstitutional statement of law more favorable to Wilson, the prosecution called
Wilson to testify and allowed him to tell the grand jurors why Brown was
dangerous and why he was justifiably compelled to use deadly force against
Brown. Wilson stated that in the nanoseconds it took for Brown to walk past his
moving vehicle, he noticed stolen cigarillos in Brown's hand.34 According to
Wilson, after he told Brown not to walk in the middle of the street, Brown,
unarmed, struck Wilson repeatedly in the face while Wilson, in uniform and armed,
was seated in a readily identifiable police-issued SUV.Y Wilson claimed that
Brown paused from pummeling him in his SUV long enough to pass the cigarillos
to Dorian Johnson, Brown's companion who was present during the shooting and
the robbery of the convenient store.36 Wilson testified that during his beating from
Brown, he contemplated using his taser, mace, and flashlight against Brown.37
Wilson stated that when he pointed his firearm directly in Brown's face and told
Brown to "stand back or I'm going to shoot you," Brown retorted that Wilson was
"too much of a pussy" to shoot.38 Wilson claimed that, after he shot at Brown
within his SUV, Brown paused, stared at him like a demon, and charged him
again.39 Wilson also testified that Brown continuously charged him after he had
Scott, the Court found law enforcement actions reasonable where a deputy sheriff rammed a motorists
from behind to end a public endangering car chase after the deputy sought to stop the defendant for
driving 73 miles-per-hour in a 55-mile zone. Id. at 373-74. The deputy's actions caused the car to
crash and left the defendant a quadriplegic. Id. at 375. The Court reasoned that the fleeing driver
"posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to . . ." innocent persons on the
road, rendering the officer's action-seizure-reasonable. Id. at 372. In Graham, the Court clarified
its pronouncements in both Garner and Scott, stating, "[Wlhat was implicit in Garner's analysis . .
." is "that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in
the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under
the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard.. . ." Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
33 On September 15, 2014, the prosecution provided the grand jurors with the unconstitutional statute.
See Transcript, vol. 5, at 5. On November 21, 2014, the prosecution provided the correct statute. See
Transcript of Grand Jury, vol. 24 at 134, Ferguson Police Shooting, Nov. 21, 2014, available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1 370537-grand-jury-volume-24.html [hereinafter
Transcript, vol. 24]; see also Flatow, supra note 32.
34 Transcript, vol. 5, at 209.
" Transcript, vol. 5, at 208-10.
36 Transcript, vol. 5, at 211-12.
37 Transcript, vol. 5, at 213-14.
38 Transcript, vol. 5, at 214.
* Transcript, vol. 5, at 224-25.
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already fired four separate rounds of bullets, hitting Brown with 6 of those
bullets.40
After hearing the evidence, the grand jury declined to indict Wilson. In
addition, Wilson's supporters raised nearly a half million dollars on Wilson's
behalf, allowing him and the wife he married while under Brown's murder41
investigation, to move, buy a new home, and pay his legal expenses.42
As the investigation and grand jury proceeded, several layers of
investigative and prosecutorial irregularities 4 3 emerged, each peculiarity
reinforcing the problems exacerbated by the other. At the scene of the shooting
itself, Wilson was allowed to leave unescorted, before being formally interviewed
or processed; to wash blood off his hands; and to place his recently fired weapon
into an evidence bag himself, all of which violated protocols for handling a crime
scene and securing evidence." The officers that interviewed Wilson immediately
after the shooting did not record the interview. 45 An investigator from the medical
examiner's office made a decision not to take measurements at the crime scene and
4o See Frances Robles & Julie Bosman, Autopsy Shows Michael Brown Was Struck at Least 6 Times,
N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/18/us/michael-brown-autopsy-
shows-he-was-shot-at-least-6-times.html.
41 The use of the word "murdering" connotes a legal conclusion that ordinarily requires a trial and a
jury's finding of guilt. In the case of Michael Brown, there was no indictment, let alone a trial or
finding of guilt. As a result, I generally refer to Darren Wilson's "killing" of Brown or Brown's
"killing" to reference the events surrounding Brown's death. From time to time, however, I reference
the "murder investigation" surrounding Brown's killing because there was an investigation and
adjudication surrounding the events, however flawed.
42 Jake Halpern, The Cop, NEW YORKER, (Aug. 10 & 17, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/10/the-cop.
43 Whether the Wilson investigation technically breached any rules or ethical codes in its problematic
prosecution of Wilson is debatable, particularly given the broad discretion afforded prosecutors in
the grand jury; however, the Wilson grand jury proceedings were rife with numerous procedural
irregularities out of step with typical grand jury practice and at complete odds with the grand jury
proceedings that have led to America becoming the most carceral nation in history. In addition, the
procedural irregularities in the Wilson proceeding sparked the American Civil Liberties Union of
Missouri to file a civil action on behalf of a person known only as "grand juror Doe," and a lawsuit
filed by the American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri. Ryan J. Reilly, Darren Wilson Grand Juror
Sues, Accusing Ferguson Prosecutor Of Mischaracterizing Case, HUFFINGTON PosT (Jan. 5, 2015)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/05/bob-mcculloch-wilson-case_n_6417370.html. In the
complaint, Doe states, "From Plaintiffs perspective, the presentation of evidence presented to the
grand jury investigating Wilson, differed markedly and in significant ways from how evidence was
presented in the hundreds of matters presented to the grand jury earlier in its term." Id. Doe's
complaint also stated that the "investigation of Wilson had a stronger focus on the victim Brown than
in any other cases" presented to the grand jury. The juror also states in the lawsuit, that "explanation
of the law was made in a muddled and untimely manner" compared with the other cases that were
presented to the grand jurors.
' Jerry Markon & Tom Hamburger, Unorthodox Police Procedures Emerge In Grand Jury
Documents, WASH. PosT (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/seemingly-
unorthodox-police-procedures-emerge-in-grand-jury-documents/2014/11/25/48152574-74e0- 11 e4-
bd lb-03009bd3e984_story.html.
45 Id.; Transcript, vol. 5, at 85.
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arrived at the scene having decided that the incident between Brown and Wilson
was "self-explanatory." 46
During the grand jury proceeding, when the prosecutors allowed Wilson
to testify, the prosecutors utterly abandoned their cross-examining role, which
contrasted sharply with their treatment of their own witnesses whose testimony
they scoured.47 The prosecutors did not ask Wilson, the paradigm of a self-
interested witness, what he reported to his supervisor on the day of the shooting
nor did they attempt to track the consistency, or lack thereof, of Wilson's narrative,
which he changed several times.4 8 Within six days of the shooting, Ferguson police
released a video of Brown robbing a convenient store.49 On the same day, Police
Chief Thomas Jackson publically announced that Wilson was not aware that
Brown "was a suspect in the case" and instead had stopped him and a companion
"because they were walking down the street blocking traffic."so Chief Thomas was
himself the target of several race discrimination complaints and later resigned after
the scathing Department of Justice (DOJ) Report castigated the City of Ferguson
for systemically targeting Blacks." Despite Chief Thomas's public proclamation
that Wilson did not know that Brown was a suspect in the convenient store robbery,
Wilson testified before the grand jury that he passed Brown and Johnson in the
street, told them to walk on the sidewalk, drove past them, absorbed an epithet
from Brown, backed up his car, and in that instant saw the stolen cigarillos in
Brown's hand.52 At no point, did the prosecutor ask Wilson why the Chief of Police
would announce that Wilson did not know about the robbery.5 3 Because the Rules
of Evidence do not apply to grand jury proceedings, the question would have been
fair game and Wilson free to say that he was not responsible for the Chiefs
statements, if that were his answer.54 The prosecution could have also cross-
examined Wilson about anything he might have said that would lead anyone within
the department to believe that he had not in fact heard the robbery dispatch, which
would have greatly diminished the reasonableness of his use of force on Brown.
46 Id
47 See Transcript, vol. 5, at 196-28 1.
48 See id.
49 Tanzina Vega, Timothy Williams, & Erik Eckholm, Dueling Police Statements as Anger Rises in
Missouri, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014) at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/16/us/darren-wilson-identified-as-officer-in-fatal-shooting-in-
ferguson-missouri.html
5o John Eligon, Ferguson Police Chief Thomas Jackson, Steps Down Amid Criticism, N.Y. TIMES
(March 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/us/ferguson-police-chief-thomas-jackson-
steps-down-michael-brown.html.
51 Id.
52 Transcript, vol. 5, at 208-09.
5 See id. at 196-281.
54 "While the Federal Rules of Evidence are not binding on Missouri courts, they are suggestive." 33
Mo. Prac., Courtroom Handbook On Mo. Evid. § 101.4 (2016 ed.); see also Boyer v. City of Potosi,
77 S.W.3d 62, 69 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2002). The reach of the Federal Rules of Evidence is set out in
Rules 101 and 1101; see also Federal Rules of Evidence I101(d)(2).
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Similarly, the prosecution could have cross-examined Wilson about the likelihood
of his seeing the cigarillos in Brown's hands in the nanoseconds that it took Wilson
to drive past Brown or the dubiousness of his allegedly hearing the robbery
dispatch before seeing Brown, which stands in stark contrast to his telling the
robbery suspects to refrain from jaywalking. Nevertheless, we will never know
Wilson's responses because the prosecution never confronted him. Furthermore,
on the day of the shooting, the first person Wilson reported to was his supervising
officer. Wilson's supervising officer testified, under oath, to the grand jury that
Wilson reported to him after the shooting and in later conversations that he was
not aware of the convenient store robbery and that Brown and Johnson's
jaywalking drew his attention to them."s Asking Wilson why his supervisor would
say that Wilson was unaware of the robbery when he confronted Brown would
have been fair game in the grand jury. The question would have allowed the grand
jurors to inspect Wilson's demeanor evidence when being challenged about his
story; however, such demeanor evidence does not exist and we will never know
what Wilson's answer would have been because the prosecution utterly failed to
confront Wilson about this glaring evidentiary conflict. Despite these glaring
evidentiary conflicts that went to the core of Wilson's initial encounter with
Brown, reason for stopping him, and justification for the use of force, the
prosecution never once challenged Wilson.56
Although the prosecution abandoned its cross-examining function with
Wilson and relinquished any possibility of obtaining subsequent impeachment
materials, to challenge Wilson in the future, the prosecution engaged an unbridled
decimation of its own witnesses and permanently damaged their credibility for any
future proceeding, such as the then ongoing federal probe as well as any civil action
Brown's family could later bring. 57 In stark contrast to the rigorous confrontation
* Transcript, vol. 5, at 52-53, 57-58, 206-209.
5 Goldwasser, supra note 25, at 45.
* In decimating its own witnesses, the prosecution created Giglio materials that could later be used
to undermine the credibility of its witnesses - a feat highly peculiar in any criminal investigation.
Giglio information or material references material tending to impeach the character or testimony of
the prosecution witness in a criminal trial. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972). Giglio
materials may include plea agreements, where the prosecution and witness have brokered a
recommended lower sentence to the sentencing court in exchange for more testimony from the
witness if the case proceeds to trial. Id. By way of explanation and in order to set the historical
development of Giglio, fifty-three years ago in Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that due
process requires the prosecution to provide the defense upon request any evidence favorable to the
accused which is material either to guilt or to punishment. 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963). Over twenty years
ago, in Giglio, the Supreme Court held that the govemment's Brady obligation to provide evidence
to the defense encompasses evidence affecting a government witness' credibility. Giglio, 405 U.S. at
154. The prosecution violates due process when it "withholds evidence on demand of an accused
which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
However, the prosecution "cannot be compelled to disclose impeachment material which would be
covered by the Jencks Act relating to any potential government witness, whether it be a witness in
the case-in-chief or a rebuttal witness." United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1285 (6th Cir. 1988).
"Further, the government need not disclose impeaching material in its possession relating to any
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of its own witnesses, prosecutors gifted Wilson leading questions, which paved the
way for him to solidify his story. 8 "For example, a prosecutor told Wilson, 'You
felt like your life was in jeopardy,' followed by, 'And use of deadly force was
justified at that point, in your opinion?[,]"'59 providing Wilson with an opportunity
to fortify his claim of a reasonable use of force in response to a perceived threat.
By contrast, the prosecutors rigorously cross-examined witnesses who
contradicted Wilson's testimony,60 elaborating the discrepancies between their
prior inconsistent statements and detailing the criminal histories of a witness,
particularly Dorian Johnson, Brown's companion and the person that had
accompanied Brown to the convenience store robbery, the video of which was
released long before any police reports related to the incident between Wilson and
Brown.6 ' In fact, prosecutors played the video of Brown robbing the store, when it
called Johnson to testify, and interrogated Johnson about the incident.
Although the prosecutors62 did not challenge Wilson about his prior
inconsistent statements, contradictions in his testimony, or discrepancies between
his testimony and other proof, they scoured their own witnesses about
inconsistencies in their accounts. In the process of decimating their own witnesses,
the prosecution created Giglio materials that Wilson's attorney could later use to
cross-examine the witnesses, destroying their credibility, if the case had gone to
trial as well as in any possible federal or civil proceeding in which the witness
might be called to testify.63 Unlike their delicate treatment of Wilson, prosecutors
fully elaborated the contradictions of their witnesses. As an example the
prosecution played a recorded interview with a witness where the witness stated,
"Yes, I personally saw him on his knees with his hands in the air."' In response,
the prosecution cross-examined the witness with the contradictions in his various
accounts. In another example, the prosecution stated to its witness, "Basically just
about everything that you said on August 13th, and much of what you said today,
isn't consistent with the physical evidence that we have in this case, O.K.?"65
In many respects, the prosecution put on a better defense of Wilson in the
grand jury proceedings than his defense attorney could have ever offered in
Wilson's case in chief at trial. In the grand jury proceeding, the prosecution not
potential defense witness where that impeaching material does not meet the Brady test of being
material and exculpatory." Id. In sum, the prosecution is not constitutionally obligated to release
exculpatory information about a witness prior to trial.
ss See Transcript, vol. 5, at 280.
' Marjorie Cohn, Prosecutor Manipulates Grand Jury Process to Shield Officer, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marjorie-cohn/prosecutor-manipulates-grand-jury-
to-shield-officer b_6240578.html.
60 Id.
6i See generally Transcript, vol. 4, at 13, 31-37, 164, & 171-76; see also Julie Bosman et al., Amid
Conflicting Accounts, Trusting the Officer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2014, at Al.
62 See generally Transcript, vol. 4, at 13, 31-37, 164, & 171-76.
63 See id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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only allowed Wilson to testify without challenge, but also brought in character
evidence to buttress Wilson and to remove the potential sting of any racial critique
to explain Wilson's conduct. Had Wilson been indicted and proceeded to trial, the
Rules of Evidence would have governed his testimony and he would have been
subject to cross examination. As an example of the character witnesses the
prosecution proffered to the grand jury, on November 11, 2014, the prosecutors
presented one of Wilson's former supervisors from another police force, and asked
about his relationship with the black community as well as standard police
practices governing the use of deadly force.66 "The witness had nothing but
positive things to say about Officer Wilson."" This is particularly ironic because
the city council that supervised Wilson's previous employer, another police
department, dismantled the police force that had employed Wilson due to tensions
between white officers and black civilians." The same city council elected to
rebuild the police force with new officers, leaving Wilson unemployed." The
prosecution made no effort to question Wilson about any of that.
Further exacerbating the layers of reinforcing procedural irregularities, the
prosecutors failed to recommend specific charges against Wilson to the grand
jurors.7 0 Typically when a grand jury serves in its accusatory capacity, as opposed
to its investigatory function, at the outset of the proceeding, prosecutors
recommend specific charges to the grand jurors by presenting a proposed
indictment, reading the proposed indictment to the grand jurors, and advising the
grand jurors about what anticipated evidence will satisfy each element of a crime
under a probable cause standard.71 Prosecutors can also explain the confusing
details regarding the elements of any offense; how elements of different offenses
are distinguishable from one another, which is particularly useful in describing the
different elements of homicide; and how specific evidence may satisfy the
confusing elements of an offense both at the outset of the proceedings and again at
the end of the proceedings, as a reminder; thereby providing the grand jurors with
an initial frame, filter, or context through which the grand jurors can screen the
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Carol D. Leonnig, Kimberly Kindy & Joel Achenbach, Darren Wilson's First Job Was On A
Troubled Police Force Disbanded By Authorities, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/darren-wilsons-first-job-was-on-a-troubled-police-force-
disbanded-by-authorities/2014/08/23/1ac796f0-2a45-1 1e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html.69 Id
70 See Goldwasser, supra note 26, at 38-39.
71 It is worth underscoring that the prosecution can make a "recommendation" or a "suggestion" as
to possible charges against the suspect as well as what evidence satisfies those charges. The
prosecution cannot usurp the function of the grand jury, which is to make an independent
determination as to whether there is enough evidence to charge the suspect under a probable cause
standard. The prosecution can make a recommendation without usurping the ultimate function of
the grand jury by reminding the grand jurors that what the prosecution says is not evidence, but is
solely intended to provide legal guidance as the grand jurors see the evidence and ultimately make
the final determinations in their deliberations.
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evidence and an ending coda reminding the grand jurors of what they have seen
and how that evidence satisfies the elements of a crime. In the Wilson proceeding,
however, prosecutors made no recommendation about what to charge against
Wilson, leaving the grand jurors to decide without guidance.72 The prosecution's
failure to make a charging recommendation to the grand jury placed the grand
jurors in a state more confusing than what a petit jury would experience because
had the case proceeded to a trial, the petit jurors would have had the advantage of
an adversarial process (if there was a will to prosecute) that would advocate for
Brown through the presentation of charges, proof, and jury instructions to guide
their deliberations.
As Law Professor Katherine Goldwasser argues, the prosecution's failure
to recommend specific charges to the grand jurors in order to frame their viewing
of the evidence and ultimate deliberations was particularly problematic for two
additional reasons. First, the prosecution unleashed a deluge of evidence on the
grand jurors.73 Typically, and where there is a will to prosecute, the prosecution
presents a case with laser focused and edited evidence reflective of its agenda,
which is to obtain an indictment against the target (again, where there is a will to
obtain an indictment). In the Wilson proceeding, however, the prosecution
unleashed a torrent of evidence unbridled in scope and without guidance. Second,
further layering the confusion from subjecting the grand jury to a deluge of
evidence without guidance through a charging recommendation, at the outset of
the grand jury proceedings, the prosecutors gave the grand jurors a law related to
Wilson's defense that was outdated and that the United States Supreme Court had
overruled.74 Although the prosecutors failed to recommend charges against
72 Bosman supra note 61; see also Goldwasser, supra note 26, at 38-39.
7 As Goldwasser argues, at the outset, Robert Mcculloch eliminated the sting of the procedural
irregularity of unleashing a deluge of evidence on the grand jurors by explaining, "Absolutely
everything will be presented to the grand jury, every scrap of paper that we have, every photograph
that was taken, every bit of paper that we have, every photograph that was taken, every bit of physical
evidence that was been gathered, every video clip, anything that we can get." Goldwasser, supra
note 25, at 40 (citing Robert McCulloch, Prosecuting Att'y for St. Louis Cnty., MO, Press
Conference, KSDK.coM (Aug 13, 2014)).
74 At the outset of the grand jury proceedings, the prosecution read the grand jurors Mo. REv. STAT.
563(3)(2)(a) (1979), a statute analogous to that overruled by the Supreme Court in Tennessee v.
Garner. 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985). In Garner, the Supreme Court struck down a Tennessee statute,
which like the Missouri statute, allowed the police to use deadly force on a fleeing felon where the
suspect was neither armed nor seemingly dangerous. Id. In Garner, the Court held, "Where the
officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either
to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly
force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe
that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical
harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning
has been given." Id. Thus, the statute that the prosecution provided the grand jurors during the outset
of the grand jury proceeding was not only erroneous, it was much more favorable to Wilson. See
Nicole Flatow, This Mistake Skewed The Law In Darren Wilson's Favor, Think Progress (Nov. 30,
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Wilson, they did provide the grand jurors with Wilson's defense, which was
outdated, legally unsound, and yet highly favorable to Wilson.75 The prosecution
gave the grand jurors a Missouri statue76 that the Supreme Court had over-ruled in
an analogous case of police force in 1985.77 The prosecutor corrected the record
two months after providing the grand jurors with the wrong statute and long after
Wilson's testimony, allowing the more favorable statute to frame and filter the
evidence, including Wilson's testimony.' 8
In yet another display of procedural irregularity, leaving the grand jurors
in a deluge of unguided evidence, up until the last day of the proceedings, the
prosecutors failed to provide the grand jurors with the Missouri homicide statute,
which specifies when the police can use deadly force to effect an arrest and which
would have also guided the grand jurors as to which pieces of evidence satisfied
the elements.79 Typically, a prosecutor will read the applicable statutes at the outset
of the grand jury proceedings and explain them in detail in order to guide the jurors
as they hear and see the anticipated proof. There again, the prosecution provided
the grand jurors with Wilson's defense months before suggesting which crimes he
may have committed.so
Beyond these procedural irregularities, a lingering pale of suspicion
engulfs Saint Louis County Chief Prosecutor Robert McCulloch and his ability to
be objective when a white officer has killed a black male. McCulloch himself was
a victim of violence. A black man killed McCulloch's father, a white police officer,
in the line of duty when McCulloch was 12 years old.8 1 When announcing the
grand jurors' no bill, many noted that McCullough delivered his announcement
like a defense attorney, giving his closing argument for his client, Wilson, in a jury
trial, characterizing and analyzing the witnesses' testimony in the light most
favorable to the officer.8 2 In addition, "McCulloch has a history of bias in favor of
2014), https://thinkprogress.org/this-mistake-skewed-the-law-in-darren-wilsons-favor-
9374d3fbal 7#.fwl i lvor6.
75 See Goldwasser, supra note 26, at 41.
76 You must find "[p]robable cause to believe that he committed the offense, which means that he
met all the elements of that offense . . . . And you must find probable cause to believe that Darren
Wilson did not act in lawful self-defense and you must find probable cause to believe that Darren
Wilson did not use lawful force in making an arrest. And only if you find those things, which is kind
of like finding a negative, you cannot return an indictment on anything or true bill unless you find
both of those things. Because both are complete defenses to any offense and they both have been
raised in his, in the evidence." Transcript, vol. 24, at 140.
n See generally Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
7 See sources cited supra note 32 and accompanying text
79 See Transcript, vol. 24, at 135; see also Goldwasser, supra note 26, at 41.
so See Goldwasser, supra note 26, at 42.
1 Kimberly Kindy, Objectivity of prosecutor in Missouri shooting of Michael Brown is questioned,
WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/objectivity-of-prosecutor-
in-missouri-shooting-of-michael-brown-is-questioned/2014/08/15/1 fe20690-24bc- 11 e4-958c-
268a320a60cestory.html.
82 Cohn, supra note 59.
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police involved in altercations with black men."83 In 2000, McCulloch
mischaracterized testimony in a case involving two black men who police killed
after firing 21 shots at them.84 "As in the Wilson case, the reasonableness of the
officers' use of deadly force was critical."" "In the 2000 case, the officers said the
two victims were driving toward them, trying to run them down, and McCulloch
claimed that all the witnesses corroborated the officers' story."" "A later federal
investigation, however, determined that the car was not moving forward, and that
only three of the thirteen officers said the car was moving forward."87 Despite this
incident, McCulloch ignored the requests of 7,000 residents in and near Ferguson
who signed a petition asking that he recuse himself in the Wilson case.88
IV. GRAND JURY BACKGROUND
Given the structural inequality in the grand jury proceedings that
privileges the prosecution and distinctively disadvantages defendants, the absence
of an indictment in the Wilson proceedings is particularly problematic. In 2010,
the most recent year for which there is data, 99.9% of the time that federal
prosecutors presented cases to a grand jury, the grand jury returned an indictment
or true bill." According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, federal prosecutors
prosecuted 162,000 federal cases in 2010, out of which the grand jury declined to
indict 11 times.90 It is just this kind of success rate that prompted a former chief
83 Id.
84 Id
85Id
86 Id.
87Id
88Id.
" Jeffery Fagan & Bernard E. Harcourt, Professors Fagan and Harcourt Provide Facts on Grand
Jury Practice In Light of Ferguson Decision, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL (Dec. 5, 2014, 12:00 PM),
https://www.law.columbia.edu/media inquiries/newsevents/2014/november2014/Facts-on-
Ferguson-Grand-Jury.
90 Id. Casselman, supra note 5; see also Bump, supra note 5. Several legal commentators have
remarked that in the rare case that grand jurors refuse to return an indictment, the prosecutor may
have presented evidence to the grand jury, but did not ultimately seek an indictment. Similarly, many
legal commentators suggest that McCulloch could use the grand jury as an investigative body to vet
the evidence and to act as a barometer as to whether there was a prosecutable case. There are several
responses to this claim. First, Missouri law allows prosecutors to decline prosecution. See Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 545.010, 545.030 (2016); Mo. CoNST. art. I § 17; see also Angela J. Davis, The American
Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. Rev. 393, 408 (2001)
(stating, "The charging decision is arguably the most important prosecutorial power and the strongest
example of the influence and reach ofprosecutorial discretion."). As a direct result, McCulloch could
have declined prosecution. Second, even if he decided in good faith to allow the grand jurors to
decide the existence of probable cause, the irregularities in the Wilson grand jury proceedings still
remain and stand in stark contrast to standard grand jury operations; thus, the claim that McCulloch
merely allowed the grand jury to make the determination as to whether a prosecution should proceed
or that McCulloch may use the grand jury for political cover does not explain the irregularities in the
Wilson grand jury proceedings or the anti-indictment bias that saturated the process. See Goldwasser,
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judge of the highest New York state court, Sol Wachtler, to remark that prosecutors
can "get a grand jury to indict a ham sandwich.""
The overwhelming success rate for prosecutors in grand jury proceedings
is a function of court-sanctioned structural inequality that privileges the
prosecution over the defendant. In an opinion, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia,
the Supreme Court concretized the structural mechanisms that ensure prosecutorial
advantage and success in the grand jury. Writing for the majority, Scalia
emphasized that the grand jury is a non-adversarial proceeding, meaning the
defendant has no right to be present-let alone testify or be accompanied by a
lawyer.92 In fact, the suspect or target has no constitutional right to know about the
proceedings at all, particularly where the grand jury is serving in its investigative
capacity. Only the prosecutor; the witnesses, which the prosecutor has sole
discretion to call or not call; the grand jurors; and the transcriptionists are present.
supra note 26, at 42 (stating, "the [Wilson] grand jury presentation was seriously compromised
because it was driven from start to finish by a Darren-Wilson-should-not-be-indicted bias so
pervasive and powerful that a 'no true bill' was inevitable.").
9' Sam Howe Verhovek, Wachtler's Reversal ofFortune; Fallout From ChiefJudge's Arrest Likely
to Extend to Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/09/nyregion/wachtler-s-reversal-fortune-fallout-chief-judge-s-
arrest-likely-extend-courts.html. Wilson's case involved a state grand jury, as opposed to a federal
one; thus, the federal statistics are not directly comparable to Missouri. Moreover, unlike federal
courts, which mandate grand juries for felony cases (see, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,
538 (1884)), Missouri allows prosecutors to decide between proceeding by way of the grand jury or
complaint and information. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 545.010. If a prosecutor elects to proceed via a
complaint and information, the prosecutor files a complaint and engages a preliminary hearing to
determine whether there is probable cause to proceed with the adjudication. Mo. R. CRIM. P. 22.09(a).
Provided that there is a probable cause finding, the prosecutor then files a formal information. Mo.
R. CluM. P. 23.03. Despite these variances in procedure between federal and Missouri cases, and as
Wachtler's observation suggests, legal experts agree that it is the rare instance that prosecutors fail
to secure an indictment. Casselman, supra note 5 (quoting law professor and grand jury expert Adrew
D. Leipold, who stated, "If the prosecutor wants an indictment and doesn't get one, something has
gone horribly wrong. It just doesn't happen.").
92 United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 49 (1992) (stating, "We have twice suggested, though not
held, that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach when an individual is summoned to
appear before a grand jury, even if he is the subject of the investigation."). Like the federal law, in
Missouri the target of an investigation, and soon to be defendant (if there is a will to prosecute and
there is a probable cause finding), has no right to testify before the grand jury. 19 Mo. Prac., Criminal
Practice & Procedure § 12:8 (3d ed. 2013). Moreover, Missouri essentially follows the same grand
jury procedure as the federal system. The Criminal Case: Grand Jury MissouRI BAR,
http://www.mobar.org/ThreeColumnPB.aspx?pageid=10547&id=1359 #Grand%20Jury (last visited
Oct. 4, 2016). Aside from the number ofjury members, number needed to indict, and amount of time
that jurors serve, the grand jury process appears to be work in the same way for both Missouri county
courts and U.S. District Courts (MO: 12 jurors serve 3-6 months; 9 needed to indict. Federal: 16-
23 jurors serve up to 18 months; 12 jurors needed to indict.). Fagan Jeffrey & Bernard E. Harcourt,
Professors Fagan and Harcourt Provide Facts on Grand Jury Practice in Light of Ferguson
Decision, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL,
https://www.law.columbia.edu/media inquiries/newsevents/2014/november2014/Facts-on-
Ferguson-Grand-Jury (last visited Oct. 4, 2016).
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A judge is not present and the jurors deliberate in complete secrecy. It stands to
reason that defendants are not entitled to the discovery in grand jury proceedings.
The defendant is not entitled to the prosecutor's proof before there has been a
charge and an arraignment on an indictment." Still further, the defendant is not
entitled to the exculpatory, Brady, or Giglio materials until at or near the time of
trial, which may in fact be after the plea negotiating process.94 This is particularly
salient because Wilson had access to exculpatory Brady materials as well as Giglio
long before any potential trial.
Further cementing the prosecutorial advantage is the inapplicability of the
Rules of Evidence in grand jury proceedings." As a result, prosecutors are free to
submit a veritable "hearsay heaven."" Because grand jury proceedings are non-
adversarial and the Rules of Evidence do not apply, the prosecutor has sole
authority and control over how much evidence is submitted to the grand jury, what
evidence is submitted to the grand jury, how that evidence is presented to the grand
jury, and the narratives that frame the proof." As an example, the prosecutor has
sole discretion as to which witnesses to call. Because hearsay is permissible, the
prosecutor may elect to present the entire case through the testimony of the main
investigating officer or agent.
Furthermore, the prosecution, in an effort to indict (provided that there is
a desire to indict), can show the grand jurors evidence that may be suppressible in
latter proceedings. For example, evidence that violates the defendant's Miranda
rights, Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, or
any other constitutional right is fair game for presentation to the grand jury.98 The
93 FED. R. CRnm. P. 16(a)(2); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (stating that due
process only violated when favorable evidence withheld after request); U.S. v. Williams, 504 U.S.
36, 51 (1992); State v. Easter, 661 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
94 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, 122 S. Ct. 2450, 2455 (2002).
9 FED. R. EVID. 1 101(d)(2); see, e.g., supra note 43 and accompanying text.
9 6 E.g., Williams, 504 U.S. at 50 (1992) (stating that "we declined to enforce the hearsay rule in grand
jury proceedings, since that 'would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution, in
which laymen conduct their inquiries unfettered by technical rules."' (quoting Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956)). A Missouri grand jury may entertain hearsay evidence. E.g., State
v. Brown, 588 S.W.2d 745, 746 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1979); State v. Randolph, 139 Mo. App. 314,
123 S.W. 61 (1909); see also 28 Mo. Prac., Criminal Practice & Procedure § 5:9 (3d ed. 2015).
9 See 19 Mo. Prac., Criminal Practice & Procedure § 12:2 (3d ed. 2015). Because the prosecutor is
the sole authority on the amount, kind, and scope of the evidence presented to the grand jury, subject
to the probable cause standard, "whole cases are often presented in well under an hour." Goldwasser,
supra note 26, at 38; see also, e.g., Transcript of Grand Jury, vol. 2 at 7, State v. Wilson, Sept. 3,
2014, available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1370515-grand-jury-volume-2.html.
Wilson's grand jury proceeding, by contrast, lasted for 70 hours over the course of 3 months and met
on 25 days. Goldwasser, supra note 26, at 38. Moreover, in the Wilson proceeding, "the prosecution
called 60 witnesses, played hours upon hours of video and audio recordings, and presented hundreds
of photographs, maps, diagrams, reports and other exhibits." Id.
9' E.g., Williams, 504 U.S. at 50 (stating that "we rejected the proposal that the exclusionary rule be
extended to grand jury proceedings, because of 'the potential injury to the historic role and functions
of the grand jury."' (quoting Costello, 350 U.S. at 363)). A Missouri grand jury may entertain
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grand jurors in an effort to charge (again, where there is a desire to charge) can,
and often do, see evidence that the petit jurors may never see because the defendant
may successfully suppress unconstitutionally obtained evidence before trial,
further strengthening the prosecution's discretion, control, and power in the grand
jury.
The evidence the prosecution does tender to the grand jury is not subjected
to the veritable truth serum of cross-examination or challenge, which is true in the
adversarial setting of a trial. The prosecutor can submit as little or as much
evidence to the grand jury, subject to the limitation of the burden of proof. Unlike
petit juries that decide the ultimate guilt or innocence of a defendant based on the
highest standard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt,oo grand jurors merely make
a decision to indict a defendant by a much lower standard of proof, "probable
cause," which the Supreme Court has defined as "the kind of 'fair probability' on
which 'reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act.""'" The
prosecution not only has sole discretion as to which witnesses to call, but also as a
technical matter, the prosecution cannot cross-examine its own witnesses. Cross-
examination is left to the adversary, but in grand jury proceedings there is no
adversary. As a consequence, prosecutors are not required to cross-examine their
own witnesses; rarely do so; and when they do, there is no technical nomenclature
for it. This is particularly true because the prosecution does not want, under any
circumstances, to create contradictory testimony from its own witnesses. Such
contradictory testimony becomes what is known as Giglio materials and the
prosecution is constitutionally obligated to turn those materials over to the
adversary before trial. Moreover, the defense attorney can use the Giglio materials
to cross-examine the prosecutions witnesses.
In a typical accusatory case, the prosecutor calls one or two witnesses,
usually the reporting, lead, or main investigating officer. Because the prosecutor
single-handedly controls the evidence in the grand jury proceeding, the prosecutor
has the discretion to limit the number of witnesses to as few as one as well as the
ability to script the question and answers of any given witness prior to the grand
testimony, subject to a clear requirement that the testimony be truthful. Typically,
the prosecutor limits the testimony of its witnesses in order to avoid creating
contradictions and inconsistencies, which lead to impeachment, or Giglio,
materials for later use by defense attorneys, if in fact, the grand jury indicts. In
more complex cases, a prosecutor may choose to call additional witnesses and to
evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful search. E.g., Brown, 588 S.W.2d at 746; Randolph, 139
Mo. App. at 314; see also 19 Mo. Prac., Criminal Practice & Procedure § 5:9 (3rd ed. 2015).
99 See Costello, 350 U.S. at 363.
' See Williams, 504 U.S. at 51, 69 (making the following two statements in the opinion: "To the
contrary, requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence would
alter the grand jury's historical role, transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory body."
and "A grand jury proceeding is an exparte investigatory proceeding to determine whether there is
probable cause to believe a violation of the criminal laws has occurred .... ).
"oI Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235
(1983)).
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submit forensic proof. In order to protect the integrity of the witness's testimony,
the prosecutor may direct the witness to refrain from talking to anyone else about
the case without informing the prosecution. The prosecutor can also prepare a
written statement for the witness to read to the grand jury; direct the witness to
review the statement for complete and total accuracy before testifying in the grand
jury; have the witness review the statement with an attorney, for even more
accuracy; and then allow the witness to read the statement to the grand jurors. After
the witness has read the statement, the prosecution can ask the grand jury
foreperson to excuse the witness; ask the grand jurors if they have any questions
of the witness; meet the witness outside the presence of the grand jurors; ask the
witness the question; and have the witness return to answer the question if the
prosecutor is satisfied that the witness can answer the question without
jeopardizing the case as well as the witness's credibility. If the question bears no
relevance as to the probable cause determination, the prosecution, which is the
legal advisor to the grand jury, can inform the grand jury that the question lacks
relevance or materiality. In sum, the prosecution has a constitutionally prescribed
arsenal to protect its witnesses, the integrity of witness testimony, and the viability
of the prosecution.
Most importantly, with respect to the structural inequality favoring the
prosecution and disfavoring the defendant, the Supreme Court has consistently
held that the prosecution is not required to present exculpatory information to the
grand jury.10 2 In explaining the reasoning behind the absence of exculpatory
materials in grand jury proceedings, Justice Scalia writing on behalf of the Court
stated:
It is axiomatic that the grand jury sits not to determine guilt or innocence,
but to assess whether there is adequate basis for bringing a criminal
charge. That has always been so; and to make the assessment it has
always been thought sufficient to hear only the prosecutor's side. As
Blackstone described the prevailing practice in 18th-century England,
the grand jury was only to hear evidence on behalf of the prosecution,
for the finding of an indictment is only in the nature of an enquiry or
accusation, which is afterwards to be tried and determined. So also in the
United States. According to the description of an early American court,
three years before the Fifth Amendment was ratified, it is the grand jury's
function not "to enquire . . . upon what foundation the charge may be
denied, or otherwise to try the suspect's defenses, but only to examine
upon what foundation the charge is made by the prosecutor." As a
consequence, neither in this country nor in England has the suspect under
102 Missouri law does not require the submission of exculpatory materials to the grand jury. E.g.,
State v. Easter, 661 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); see also Mo. Prac., Criminal Practice &
Procedure § 5:9 (3rd ed. 2015).
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investigation by the grandjury ever been thought to have a right to testify
or to have exculpatory evidence presented.103
Considering the Supreme Court's reasoning and pronouncements, it is
absolutely incredible that Wilson not only testified before the grand jury, but he
was allowed to provide his story over the course of four hours without cross
examination" or challenge (unlike the other witnesses); the prosecutors used other
evidence, including forensic proof to corroborateo' his claims; and the prosecution
used other evidence, including witness testimony to frame Wilson's alleged fears,
particularly about Brown's dangerousness, all of which provided legal justification
for Wilson's killing of Brown. As Goldwasser argues, the prosecution also called
Wilson as a witness during the initial phases of the proceeding - the ninth out of
60 witnesses - allowing his story to guide their apprehension of the remaining
presentation of proof particularly in a deluge of evidence without guidance in the
form of a proposed indictment or the Missouri homicide statute. 06 Seven of the
eight witnesses that testified before Wilson had either spoken to Wilson about the
event or had interviewed someone that had spoken to Wilson. The prosecution
asked each of the seven about the salient aspects of Wilson's defense, particularly
that Brown had assaulted him while he was sitting in his car;' 07 Wilson chased
Brown because Brown would assault or harm someone else;' and that Brown
turned around, charged at Wilson, and caused Wilson to fear for his life.1' 9 By the
time Wilson completed his testimony, the prosecution had called nine witness,
including Wilson, that substantiated Wilson's defense, which the prosecution had
based on an unconstitutional law more favorable to Wilson.
The prosecution not only submitted the exculpatory materials to the grand
jury, but Wilson's defenses framed the evidence. Moreover, Wilson had access to
the state's discovery before he testified. Despite the myriad means for protecting
103 Williams, 504 U.S. at 51-52 (internal punctuation and citations omitted).
10 As a technical matter, the prosecution cannot cross-examine its own witnesses. Cross-examination
is left to the adversary, but in grand jury proceedings there is no adversary. This is not to say,
however, that the prosecutors had to refrain from attempting to create inconsistent statements that
could later be used to impeach Wilson.
105 As an example, after Wilson testified that Brown started pummeling him while he was armed,
uniformed, and seated in police issued SUV; that Brown paused long enough to pass Johnson the
cigarillos; and that Brown responded to Wilson with an insulting epithet after Wilson pointed a gun
in his face, the prosecutor retrieved several exhibits, one of which was a picture of Wilson's face
showing swelling. Testimony, vol. 5, at 220. Not only did the prosecutor corroborate Wilson's claim,
but failed to subject him to any questioning concerning the questionable probability of an unarmed
youth pummeling an armed, uniformed officer, seated in a police issued SUV, pausing to give a
package to his companion; responding to a gun pointed in his face with an epithet; and the absence
of severe bruising after being punched by Hulk Hogan.
106 Goldwasser, supra note 26, at 42.
" Transcript, vol. 5, at 32.
10 Transcript, vol. 5, at 33-34.
109 Goldwasser, supra note 26, at 43.
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witness testimony, the prosecution thoroughly challenged its own witnesses,
concretely damaging their credibility for any future proceeding, in sharp contrast
to its delicate treatment of Wilson. Moreover, as Goldwasser compellingly argues,
in presenting all the evidence, including the unconstitutionally required
exculpatory proof, the prosecution gave the grand jurors evidence "that no
prosecutor who was actually trying to help them do their job - that is, trying to
help them determine whether there was probable cause to believe that Darren
Wilson had committed a crime when he killed Michael Brown - would ever
present." 1 o In sum, the prosecution presented Wilson's case-in-chief without the
benefit of challenge from an adversary. Instead of prosecuting Wilson, the
prosecutors convicted Brown through Wilson's case-in-chief. Moreover, the
prosecution presented a defense for Wilson far outstripping anything a defense
attorney could have provided Wilson in its case in chief at trial.
V. STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO INDICTING WHITE OFFICERS
WHO KILL BLACK PEOPLE"'
Despite the structural advantage prosecutors enjoy in grand jury
proceedings, indictments of police officers who kill black people are more the
exception than the rule, which is the case in Ferguson. Criminologist Philip M.
Stinson indicates that only 41 officers faced murder or manslaughter charges from
on-duty shootings over a seven-year period, which ended in 2011.112 Over that
same period, legal scholars Jeffery Fagan and Bernard E. Harcourt note that the
FBI received reports of 2,600 justifiable homicides from police departments across
the country. From 1976 to 2012, according to FBI statistics, St. Louis County
officers fatally shot 186 people.113 Professors Fagan and Harcourt go on to report,
"Law enforcement reported self-defense ('felon attacked officer') in 77 of these
incidents (41.3%).114 In another 15 (8.1%), the killings occurred when the 'felon
attacked a fellow officer.""'s From 1990, one year before McCulloch became the
St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney, through 2012, officers fatally shot 112
o
10 Id. at 40.
"' It is imperative to note that the following analysis would look markedly different where a black
male officer killed an unarmed female for example. The grand jury inversion that occurs when white
officers kill black people lacks application to the latter.
12 James C. McKinley Jr. & Al Baker, A System, With Exceptions, That Favors Police in Fatalities,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/08/nyregion/grand-juries-seldom-
charge-police-officers-in-fatal-actions.html?_r-0.
113 Jeffery Fagan & Bernard E. Harcourt, Professors Fagan and Harcourt Provide Facts on Grand
Jury Practice In Light of Ferguson Decision, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL (Dec. 5, 2014, 12:00 PM),
https://www.law.columbia.edu/media-inquiries/news-events/2014/november2014/Facts-on-
Ferguson-Grand-Jury.
114 Id.
115 Id
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civilians times; 80 (71.4%) of the victims were Black."' From 2005 to 2012,
officers fatally shot 53 civilians; thirty-seven (69.8%) of the victims in those
shootings were Black. During McCulloch's reign, which began in 1991, 33 police
officers have been criminally prosecuted, 20 have been convicted, and 5 cases
remain pending."'7 On at least four occasions, prosecutors presented cases
involving police killings of citizens while on the job, where the grand jury failed
to return an indictment." 8 Brown is the fifth case in which the officer was not
indicted." There are three main reasons that police shooting cases so rarely lead
to indictments, despite the fact that grand jury indictments in general are
overwhelmingly successful: biased investigations, prosecutions stemming from an
inherent conflicts of interests, and the collective bargaining power of police unions.
A. Biased Investigation and Prosecution: Inherent Conflict of Interest
Prosecutors and police are part of the single knit unit of law enforcement:
They form the same side of the adversarial wall. Generally, police ensure the
integrity of the investigation, while prosecutors secure the merits of the
adjudication. The two work in complete tandem. Not infrequently prosecutors,
officers, and agents will refer to one another as "brother," evincing a sense of
fraternity, kinship, bonding, shared cause, and mutual destiny. Prosecutors and
officers are mutually dependent and frequently operate on a sense of fraternity,
trust, and kinship--each relying on the integrity of the other in order to protect and
ensure sound investigations and prosecutions. Prosecutors not only trust the police
to bring them sound cases, free of unconstitutionally derived evidence, like forced
confessions, but prosecutors must rely on officers' integrity, ability to testify about
the investigation and evidence, and credibility to withstand cross-examination.
Prosecutors often engage meticulous efforts to protect the integrity of their cases,
including preparing their officers for both direct examination and cross-
examination before every hearing and in particular before trial. Again, prosecutors
engage great efforts and pains to preserve the integrity of their witness' testimony
through preparation before testifying and clear avoidance of creating impeachment
or Giglio materials. Officers are vital, if not indispensable, parts of a prosecution.
The mutual dependency between police and prosecutors presents an inherent
conflict of interest when prosecutors prosecute their "brothers" accused of
excessive use of force, likened to members of the same family prosecuting one
another. Similar problems adhere when police investigate their colleagues.
" Id. (citing Heather Cole, Background Check: Looking at McCulloch's Prosecution History,
Missouu LAWYER'S WEEKLY, Sept. 8, 2014, available at
http://molawyersmedia.com/2014/09/08/background-check-looking-at-mccullochs-prosecution-
history/).
118 Id.
119 Id.
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The prime example of this in the case of Wilson and Brown is how
Wilson's supervising officer allowed Wilson to leave the murder scene without
being questioned or processed for evidence, including allowing Wilson to return
to the police station unescorted, to wash blood from his hands, and to bag his own
murder weapon in an evidence bag. It is inconceivable that a civilian shooter would
receive such privilege under any circumstances. This points to an inescapable
problem in the investigation of Wilson, the inherent conflict of interests where
police officers investigate other officers, and a structural impediment in police
shootings of black persons. In criminal investigations, particularly police
shootings, the suspect needs time to, as Law Professor Kenneth Lawson states,
"get his story straight. . ." before being interrogated about the details of the crime,
especially where the officer needs to cast the black victim as the villain and to
frame the shooting as carefully calibrated with a justifiable and reasonable use of
deadly force, for example, claiming the victim reached at his waistband for a what
appeared to be a gun.120 Unlike other homicide suspects, officers are given
12 Kenneth Lawson, Police Shootings ofBlack Men and Implicit Racial Bias: Can't We All Just Get
Along, 37 U. HAW. L. REv. 339, 362 (2015); see also Saul M. Kassin et al., Interviewing Suspects:
Practice, Science, and Future Directions, 15 LEGAL & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 39, 42 (2009). It should also
be noted that "[t]he prosecutor asked witness after witness if it seemed as if Mr. Brown were reaching
for a weapon ..... Bosman, supra note 61. In several unarmed shooting cases, where the officer
needs to cast the black victim as the villain and to describe the shooting as carefully calibrated with
a justifiable and reasonable use of deadly force, officers frequently claim that the victim reached at
his waistband for a what appeared to be a gun. Kenneth Lawson, Police Shootings ofBlack Men and
Implicit Racial Bias: Can't We All Just Get Along, 37 U. HAw. L. REv. 339, 362 (2015); Wilson
told the grand jury that he thought Brown was reaching at his waistband for a gun. Moreover, implicit
bias is a useful frame for understanding not only the killing of Michael Brown but other black men
as well. In the case involving Oscar Grant, an unarmed black man at the Fruitvale BART station,
Officer Johannes Mehserle shot Grant in the back from point-blank range where Grant was lying face
down and was physically restrained by another officer. A grand jury charged Mehserle of second-
degree murder, but a petit jury only convicted him of involuntary manslaughter. The involuntary
manslaughter conviction may have reflected thejury's acceptance of two of Mehserle's claims: "first,
that he thought Grant was reaching for a gun, and second, that he mistook his own gun ... for a Taser
.... IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROss THE LAW 9 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012).
It is clear that implicit bias has the power to create a gun where none exists or to deny a gun where it
in fact exists. In the case of Levar Jones, Officer Shawn Groubert asked Jones for his license and
registration, while Jones was standing immediately outside of his car. When Jones turned to reach
inside his car for the items Groubert had just requested, Groubert responded with gunfire, hitting
Jones. Later in explaining the incident to his supervisor, Groubert claimed that Jones was continuing
to advance toward him with something black in hands, a claim negated by the video coverage. All In
With Chris Hayes: Chilling New Audio Uncovered from SC Shooting Tape, (MSNBC television
broadcast Sept. 29, 2014), available at http://www.msnbc.com/all-in/watch/chilling-new-audio-
from-sc-shooting-tape-335257667981 (showing Chris Hayes interviewing Phillip Atiba Goff,
Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles). St. Anthony police
officer Jeronimo Yanez, who is Latino, fatally shot Philando Castile during a traffic stop. His
girlfriend, who was in the car along with her small child, claims "Castile was shot while reaching for
his ID after telling the officer he had a gun permit and was armed. Yanez's attorney has said the
officer reacted after seeing a gun, and that one of the reasons he pulled Castile over was because he
thought he looked like a 'possible match' for an armed robbery suspect." How Philando Castile Told
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substantial time and opportunity to "get their story right," 2 ' particularly where the
officer must reconcile his narrative with other evidence, including dispatch
recordings; video footage; dashboard camera and body camera recordings;
forensics tests; autopsy reports that document bullet entries and exits; and other
witnesses' accounts. Typically, suspects do not have access to this evidence before
being initially interviewed nor do they have an attorney present during the initial
interview, unlike Wilson who had access to the evidence as well as attorneys
during all of his interviews, except his initial questioning by his supervisor at the
murder scene, which was not documented, and Wilson's grand jury appearance,
where he did not have counsel in the grand jury room itself. Still further, defendants
are entitled to discovery shortly after an arraignment. The discovery to which
defendants are entitled is much narrower in scope than all of the evidence. In
particular, defendants are not entitled to exculpatory materials until at or near the
time of trial. It is beyond the pale for a defendant to have all of the evidence before
an indictment has issued, let alone before providing testimony to a grand jury.
Typically, in non-officer homicide investigations, police aggressively
attempt to interrogate the suspect immediately, keeping the suspect isolated,
particularly from co-conspirators and defense attorneys.1 22 Police also attempt to
obtain a documented statement from the suspect and witnesses, leaving no time for
the suspect to concoct a defense, consult an attorney, or coordinate a narrative or
false truth. 123 Yet law enforcement rarely enforces these protocols in the aftermath
of officer shootings, and they were not followed in the specific case of Wilson. As
Lawson demonstrates, the increase of time between the homicide and the
interrogation provides the suspect with the greatly desirable resource of time to
create a narrative that exculpates the suspect, cementing the need to obtain
confessions from suspects as close to the time of the homicide, subject to
constitutional protections, of course. 12 4
Despite these standard investigative procedures, much like the standard
grand jury protocols, when law enforcement investigates excessive use of force
cases against black victims, an inversion occurs-investigators compromise
investigations, "by investigators' apparent bias in favor of clearing the officer
Officer About Gun Critical in Investigation, CHI. TRIB. (Jul. 14, 2016, 8:21PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-philando-castile-concealed-carry-20160714-
story.html. In each of these cases, implicit bias not only has the capacity to create a gun where none
exists, but the claim alone resonates for persons listening to the officers' narrative, much like an
implicit bias dog whistle.
121 Lawson, supra note 120, at 362. This is particularly true in those states that have a Law
Enforcement Bill of Rights where an officer is not required to interview after a fatal shooting, 10
days for example in Baltimore, Maryland. Paul Butler, The Police Officers'Bill of Rights Creates a
Double Standard, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015, 9:13PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/29/baltimore-and-bolstering-a-police-officers-
right-to-remain-silent/the-police-officers-bill-of-rights-creates-a-double-standard.
122 See Lawson, supra note 120, at 362.
123 Id.
124 I
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instead of objectively pursuing all of the available facts."I 2 5 Allowing Wilson to
leave the murder scene without being interviewed by the investigative team;
without being processed for evidence, with literal blood on his hands; and without
taking a documented statement paradigmatically exemplifies investigator bias and
the realizations of an inherent conflict of interest where officers investigate their
own.
B. Police Unions and Their Collective Bargaining Agreements
In addition to the inherent conflict of interest where law enforcement
investigates and prosecutes itself as well as investigator bias in that endeavor,
police unions present another structural impediment to both investigating and
prosecuting white officers who kill Blacks. With excessive use of force cases,
police officers frequently benefit from additional safeguards in their collective
bargaining agreements between their police unions and employers. 126 According
to the International Association of Chiefs of Police's Officer-Involved Shooting
Guidelines, "Whenever possible, officers should be educated on the protocol of the
investigation as well as any potential actions by the media, grand jury, or review
board prior to any formal investigative interviews."'27 Unlike a typical homicide,
an officer is frequently allowed to meet with an attorney or union representative
prior to being questioned, and the interview may not even occur on the day of the
murder. 128 An obvious contrast exists, where in typical homicide cases, officers
attempt to obtain statements from suspects immediately, preferably before they
meet with an attorney, subject to Miranda.1 2 9 Such was the case with Wilson. In
addition to being allowed to leave the murder scene without being interviewed by
anyone other than his supervisor, who never documented the discussion, or being
processed by anyone at the murder scene, Wilson was not "officially" interviewed
until the next day following the shooting, when he appeared with his attorney.' 30
VI. TIE CENTRALIZED ROLE OF RACE: IMPLICIT BIAS MADE
EXPLICIT
125 Id. (quoting CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND
DIVISION OF POLICE 34 (Dec. 4, 2014), available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/12/04/clevelandfindingsl 2-4-14.pdf).
126 See POLICE PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES SECTION, INT'L Assoc. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, OFFICER-
INVOLVED SHOOTING GUIDELINES 4 (2013), available at
http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/documents/pdfs/Psych-OfficerlnvolvedShooting.pdf, see also
Lawson, supra note 120, at 362-63.
127 OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING GUIDELINES, supra note 126, at 4-5.
128 Lawson, supra note 120, at 363.12 9 Id
13 0 Memorandum, supra note 11, at 12.
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In addition to the structural impediments to indicting white officers who
kill unarmed black people, the centrality of white heteropatriarchy as manifest in
implicit bias further explains the unusual grand jury dynamics in the Wilson
proceeding. White heteropatriarchy, like all operations of systemic power, whether
raced, gendered, classed, intersectional, or multiconscious, is omnipresent and
entrenched, yet it often remains invisible, marked (or unmarked as it were), as
inevitable, natural, justified, perfectly acceptable, and seamless. '"' Implicit bias
achieves the legitimacy of "evidence" through hegemonic performances of law, in
which the biased narratives of police officers are introduced as incontrovertible,
even when they are not supported by facts. In so doing, the white supremacist and
heteropatriarchal assumptions of implicit bias achieve legitimization through
obfuscation, invisibility, and inevitability. In summarizing the role of the law as a
legitimating function of dominance and supremacy, Crenshaw states:
Law is an essential feature in the illusion of necessity because it
embodies and reinforces ideological assumptions about human relations
that people accept as natural or even immutable. People act out their
lives, mediate conflicts, and even perceive themselves with reference to
the law. By accepting the bounds of law and ordering their lives
according to its categories and relations, people think that they are
confirming reality-the way things must be. Yet by accepting the view
of the world implicit in the law, people are also bound by its conceptual
limitations. Thus conflict and antagonism are contained: the legitimacy
of the entire order is never seriously questioned.132
Implicit bias research demonstrates that pathology perpetually clings to
the black body and innocence melds with the white body, such that, even where
the white body is engaged in treachery, it is perceived as innocent and where the
black body is engaged in innocence, it is perennially pathological. Even when a
white police officer murders an unarmed black youth in broad daylight on a
summer day in the middle of a well-traversed public street, implicit bias, which
saturates both public and legal discourses, frame the white shooter as valiant and
the black victim as demonic.
As explained in the introduction, implicit bias is a narrative that explains
the meaning we attach to objects and bodies in our unfiltered and unregulated
("unconscious") mind.' 33 "It is simply a form of categorization"l34 that affects
"perception, interpretation, encoding, retention, and recall of information about
131 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION 86 (Robert
Hurley trans., Random House 1978) (suggesting that "power is tolerable only on condition that it
mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.").
132 Crenshaw, supra note 6, at 1351-52.
3 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
134 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1187-88 (1995).
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other people.""' Using cognitive tests, neuroscientists have gathered empirical
evidence on implicit bias by measuring the time it takes to make associations
between objects and bodies. Such tests typically assess at least two types of
association: schema consistent pairings (when the objects and associations being
paired obviously "match"), and schema inconsistent pairings (when people are
asked to match objects and meanings that don't typically connect). Using these
cognitive tests, scientist can capture the time it takes to associate dangerousness,
suspiciousness, and villainy with black bodies and goodness, righteousness, and
innocence with white bodies; they can also measure the reverse - the difficulty
people have when asked to associate blackness with goodness and whiteness with
danger.'3 6
Unlike explicit bias, institutional racism, or structural racism, implicit bias
reflects nanosecond associations that are allegedly unintentional and unconscious.
For example, in one form of implicit bias testing, test-takers were given "white-
sounding" names, and were asked to pair them with good things, like goodness,
kindness, hard-working, thrifty, and moral.'3 ' The same test-takers were given
"black-sounding" names, like Ebony or Sharonda, and asked to pair those names
with unpleasant ideas like evil, immoral, unchaste, and criminal. Their response
times were relatively quick.' 38 Then the test-takers are asked to make the schema-
inconsistent pairings, and to associate the black names with goodness and white
bodies with evil. The response times were much slower.'39 Of over 14 million
Implicit Association Tests (IATs) taken, upwards of 75 percent of test takers
demonstrate implicit bias in favor of whites. 40 Although at much lower rates,
Black people also demonstrated implicit bias with 40 percent of test-takers
demonstrating favor for Whites.14 ' Given the sheer prevalence of implicit bias as
captured by the IAT, there is an argument to be made that racial hostility is
13 Id. at 1188-89.
136 See IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAs ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 120, at 9-10. Implicit bias testing operates
through cognitive psychology "priming," as seen in dog whistling: It is a stimulus that has an effect
on an unrelated task that triggers associative networks, which can include stereotypes and can
influence decision-making as well as behavior. Id. at 10.
I See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Diferences in Implicit Cognition: The
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1473-74 (1998), available at
http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/pdf/GwaldMcGhSchwJPSP_1 998.OCR.pdf
138 See id.
139 See id. at 1474.
140 Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 843, 860 (2015)
(citing MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD
PEOPLE 69 (2013)).
141 Lee, supra note 140, at 118 n. 105 (stating "that Banaji and Greenwald's research found that about
forty percent of African Americans have a pro-White bias, forty percent have a pro-Black bias, and
twenty percent are neutral").
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omnipresent and ubiquitous.' 42 Moreover, far from being an isolated thought, 4 3 if
left uncontested, it may be a permanent filter of the mind, through which we see
our reality and in particular evidence, most especially the body of proof.
A. Cognitive Tests and Officer-Involved Shootings
In addition to the prevalence of implicit bias in general terms, several
implicit bias tests capture associations that are relevant to how we see evidence in
the particular cases of officer-involved shootings such as that of Michael Brown.
Implicit biases may have worked against Brown on numerous intersectional axes:
the combination of his age, race, and gender; his presumed criminality, lunacy, and
imperviousness to pain; and his location in a "bad neighborhood" of St. Louis;
while simultaneously such biases would have worked in favor of Wilson: the
combination of his age, race, and gender, his presumed integrity as a police officer;
his presumed innocence and goodness, particularly when juxtaposed and valued
against the demonry of Brown; and his perceived vulnerability, particularly to
crime and black maleness.
B. Aggression, Children, Race, and Racially Disparate Punishment
The association of villainy with blackness and valor with whiteness occurs
at an early, formative stage. 1" Researchers have demonstrated that when children
142 Farley, supra note 2, at 486-87. (Farley's keen insights into the ubiquity of race bear repeating:
"Race is not reducible to economics or politics. Indeed, it is akin to sexuality: When taxicab drivers,
and store owners, bankers, farmers, Christian ministers, doctors, politicians, patients in mental
hospitals and their attendants, writers, university presidents, union members and mill owners,
garbage collectors and Rotarians, rich and poor, men and women, unite in common worship and
common fear of one idea we know it has come to hold deep and secret meanings for each of them,
as different as are the people themselves. We know it has woven itself around fantasies at levels
difficult for the mind to touch, until it is a part of each man's internal defense system, embedded like
steel in his psychic fortifications. And, like the little dirty rag or doll that an unhappy child sleeps
with, it has acquired inflated values that extend far beyond the rational concerns of economics and
government, or the obvious profits and losses accruing from the white-supremacy system, into
childhood memories long repressed. The meanderings of the colorline do not admit of precise
analysis. In the words of William James, 'something always escapes.' However, we neglect or deny
the colorline's ability to escape precise analysis at our peril. The naive hope of the Civil Rights
Movement that more information about subaltern suffering would change the hearts and minds of a
colorlined nation fades even further if we think of race as a form of pleasure. The suggestion that
racism in today's post-civil rights era is unconscious is secondary if we think of race as a practice
people enjoy, as a form of pleasure.").
143 See IMPLICIT RACIAL B1As AcRoss TRE LAW, supra note 120, at 19-21. Several predictive validity
tests dispel the myth that implicit bias is a mere thought unconnected to action. (discussing the affect
of implicit bias on economic discrimination, the provision health care services, and employment
discrimination).
" See generally Sagar HA & Schofield JW, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and White
Children's Perception ofAmbiguously Aggressive Acts, J. PERS. Soc. PSYCHOL., Oct. 1980.
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of different races are engaged in the exact same conduct, aggression is perceived
according to the race of the child.'45 A slight push, for example, is seen as much
more aggressive when perpetrated by a black child as opposed to a white child.146
Researchers tested sixth graders and showed them a series of pictures, where, for
example, one shoves another boy in the hallway, or one child borrows a pencil
from another child.'47 When the sixth graders were shown pictures, of black
children engaged in these behaviors, they were more inclined to see these
behaviors as aggressive, than when white children were engaged in the same
conduct.1 48 When the person in the picture was black rather than white, the
behavior was seen more mean and threatening to the participants.1 49
C. Juvenile Justice
Scholars have used implicit bias research to capture the omnipresence of
white heteropatriarchy and its entrenchment in the criminal justice system,
particularly with studies that assess how the public and law enforcement perceive
racialized dangerousness, suspiciousness, and threats.5 o "The most
comprehensive studies of racial bias in the exercise of prosecutorial and judicial
discretion involve the treatment of juveniles."'"' These studies demonstrate "that
youth of color are more likely to be arrested, detained, formally charged,
transferred to adult court, and confined to secure residential facilities than . . ."
similarly situated Whites.152 The probability that implicit bias will impact
prosecutorial discretion is especially acute in drug cases, where virtually identical
behavior is susceptible to a wide variety of interpretations and responses depending
on the race of the transgressor and where the media imagery and political discourse
surrounding these cases has been so thoroughly racialized. Implicit bias determines
whether a youth is perceived as a dangerous drug-dealing thug, as opposed to a
145 d
146 Id
1 47  d
1 48 Id
1 49 d.
"50 See IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 120, at 22-24 (discussing implicit bias
impact on judicial decision making, the probative value of evidence, racialized presumptions of
innocence).
... MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JI CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 118 (The New Press, 2010).
152 Id.; see also Thomas Rudd, Racial Disproportionality In School Discipline: Implicit Bias Is
Heavily Implicated, KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, (Feb. 2014), available
at http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/racial-disproportionality-in-school-discipline-implicit-bias-is-
heavily-implicated/ (citing a "2010 finding that over 70% of the students involved in school-related
arrests or referred to law enforcement were Hispanic or Black"). It should also be noted that these
outcomes are not necessarily the result of implicit bias, but may also be caused by institutional or
structural racism or explicit bias.
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"good kid" who was merely experimenting with drugs, selling to a few of his
friends, having a good time, and just being young.
D. Facial Bias
In another test measuring the nanosecond association of blackness with
criminality and demonry and whiteness with goodness and innocence, "a 2004
study presented 182 police officers with Black and White faces."'" The test
questioned officers as to which face "looked criminal."l54 In response, "Black faces
looked more criminal to police officers, and the darker the face, the more criminal
the officer tended to think the person was." 5
E. Black People as Animal Bias
In a study analyzing black dehumanization or Pseudospeciation, Phillip
Goff tested the time it took for test takers to detect "a degraded image of an ape
that came into focus over a number of frames" when primed with a black or white
face.15 1 When primed with consciously undetectable black faces, test takers were
able to identify the ape in fewer frames. When primed with a consciously
undetectable white face, test takers required more frames to recognize the ape. In
a similar study, Goff exposed test participants to a video of police beating a black
suspect, when primed with images of apes, test takers were more inclined to
interpret the beating as "deserved" and "justified."15 1
F. Shooter Bias
This readiness to perceive "dangerousness" as attached to a black body, or
"blackness" as the embodiment of evil, is particularly problematic in shooter bias
simulations. In shooter bias research, scientists have developed video simulations
to measure the effect of race on the decision to shoot. In this simulation, test-takers
are shown a number of white and black male images and incentivized to shoot the
person holding a gun, as opposed to the person holding an innocent object like a
flashlight or wallet. In addition, there are time pressures added to the simulation
153 Lawson, supra note 120, at 361 (citing Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and
Visual Processing, 86 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 876, 888 (2004)).
154 Id
1 55 Id.
156 IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 120, at 49 (citing Phillip Atiba Goff et al.,
Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences,
94 J. PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 292, 304-05 (2008)) (analyzing implicit bias through in criminal
cases reflecting association of Blacks with apes and positing that the dehumanizing effect of these
historical references influences perception and judgment).
117 IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 120, at 50.
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such that testers have little time to discern who is holding a gun or a flashlight.
Point penalties ensue for shooting persons holding innocent objects.
Overwhelmingly, test-takers "more quickly detected guns when primed with a
Black face than when primed with a White face." Overwhelmingly, test-takers
erroneously saw a gun "more often when the face was black than when it was
white."'5 8
In another experiment, Joshua Correll specifically tested the shooter bias
of police officers.15 ' Although the officers showed greater accuracy in detecting
the presence of a weapon than civilian test takers, the officers still demonstrated
"robust racial bias in the speed with which they made shoot/don't-shoot
decisions.""o Officers more quickly shot at armed black suspects than armed white
suspects.161 Another study throughout the United States found that officers
exhibited similar reaction time bias towards Latmias/os (Latinix) relative to Whites
and Asians. 162
G. Predictive Validity: Implicit Bias Affects Material Reality
As innocence, deniability, and righteousness continue to cling to white
heteropatriarchy, some have questioned whether implicit bias is merely an idea,
having no effect on action, decision-making, and behavior. Predictive validity
tests, however, establish a direct correlation between implicit bias and action.'16
One study measured the effect of implicit bias on a physician's treatment decisions,
specifically whether doctors held racially discriminatory implicit bias against
Blacks and whether this bias influenced their care to patients." During the study,
researchers presented 300 emergency room and internal medicine physicians with
a vignette asking them to diagnose and treat hypothetical patients, who were
depicted as either black or white.1 65 The doctors were also given several IATs.1 6 6
The results demonstrated that the doctors favored white patients to black patients
and their implicit bias predicted whether they would recommend thrombolysis
158 Lee, supra note 140, at 1557-1610 (citing B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions
and Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 287 (2006)).
"I Joshua Correll, et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision
to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1006 (2007).
160 See Joshua Correll, et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the
Decision to Shoot, 92 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1006, 1020 (2007).
161 Id. at 1007.
162 Melody S. Sadler, Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park & Charles M. Judd, The World Is Not Black
and White: Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot in a Multiethnic Context, 68 J. OF Soc. IssuEs 286,
286 (2012).
163 IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 120, at 19.
1
" See Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis
Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN INTERNAL MED. 1231, 1231 (2007), available at
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2219763/./..
166 Id.
16 6 Id.
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(clot-busting) treatment to a white or black patient suffering from myocardial
infarction. 167 The more the doctors implicitly preferred white patients, the more
likely they were to recommend thrombolysis to white, but not black patients.1 68 In
another study, researchers designed a Guilty/Not Guilty IAT, which demonstrated
that test participants strongly associated blackness with guilt as opposed to
whiteness and "that the IAT scores predicted participants' evidence judgments."'16
H. Implicit Bias Frames the Way We See Reasonableness and Becomes Its
Central Repository.
Implicit bias is the lens through which we engage the legal analysis of
whether a police officer used excessive force reasonably in the face of a perceived
danger. Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer's use of physical force
against an arrestee must be objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 170
"The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision
of hindsight."'71 "[C]areful attention [must be paid] to the facts and circumstances
of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." 72
Consideration must be extended to law enforcement officials who are often forced
to make split-second determinations in circumstances that are life threatening,
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.1 73 The use of deadly force is justified when
"the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious
physical harm, either to the officer or to others...."l74
167 Id.168 Id.
169 IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAs ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 120, at 22-23.
170 Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). The deference to police officers' discretion is
also replicated under Missouri law. Missouri Revised Statutes § 563.046 authorizes deadly force "in
effecting an arrest or in preventing an escape from custody..." if the officer "reasonably believes . .
." it is necessary in order "to effect the arrest... and also reasonably believes that the person to be
arrested ... [hias committed or attempted to commit a felony; or . .. [m]ay otherwise endanger life
or inflict serious physical injury unless arrested without delay." Mo. REV... STAT. § 563.046 (2016).
171 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
I72 Id.
173 Id. at 396-97.
174 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985); see also Nelson v. County of Wright, 162 F.3d 986,
990 (8th Cir. 1998); O'Bert ex. rel. Estate of O'Bert v. Vargo, 331 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 2003) (same
as Garner); Delunav. City of Rockford, 447 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7thCir. 2006) (citing Scott v. Edinburg,
346 F.3d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 2003) (deadly force can be reasonably employed where an "officer
believes that the suspect's actions place him, or others in the immediate vicinity, in imminent danger
of death or serious bodily injury . . .").. In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court held that an
officer cannot arrest an unarmed felony suspect by shooting him dead. If the suspect threatens the
officer with a weapon, or there is probable cause to believe he has committed a crime involving the
infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to
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The principle of reasonableness is a touchstone and linchpin of American
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.'75 If Wilson reasonably believed his life was
threatened, his use of force against Brown was legally justified, a case ofjustifiable
homicide, which is precisely what resonated for the investigators, prosecutors,
jurors, and many in the public. A police officer in Missouri can use deadly force
in making an arrest or preventing escape if he reasonably believes it is necessary
to effect the arrest and also reasonably believes the person to be arrested has
committed or attempted to commit a felony, or may otherwise endanger life or
inflict serious physical injury unless arrested without delay."' In an effort to
prevent escape. An officer may use deadly force under certain circumstances even if the suspect is
fleeing. "Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious
physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent
escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is
probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened
infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if,
where feasible, some warning has been given." Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12. An officer may not, on
the other hand, use physical force, deadly or otherwise, once a threat has been neutralized. This is
true even if the suspect threatened an officer's life - or that of another - prior to being brought under
control. See Moore v. Indehar, 514 F.3d 756, 762 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Nelson, 162 F.3d at 990.
17s [T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Brigham City, Utah v.
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
1 76 Fagan & Harcourt: Missouri Revised Statutes § 563 authorizes deadly force "in effecting an arrest
or in preventing an escape from custody" if the officer "reasonably believes" it is necessary in order
to "to effect the arrest and also reasonably believes that the person to be arrested has committed or
attempted to commit a felony. . . ... or may otherwise endanger life or inflict serious physical injury
unless arrested without delay." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031.1 (2016),
http://www.moga.mo.gov/mostatutes/stathtml/56300000311 .HTML (Use of force in defense of
persons. 563.031. 1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subsection 2 of this section, use
physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such force
to be necessary to defend himself or herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes
to be the use or imminent use of unlawful force by such other person, unless: (1) The actor was the
initial aggressor; except that in such case his or her use of force is nevertheless justifiable provided:
(a) He or she has withdrawn from the encounter and effectively communicated such withdrawal to
such other person but the latter persists in continuing the incident by the use or threatened use of
unlawful force; or (b) He or she is a law enforcement officer and as such is an aggressor pursuant to
section 563.046; or (c) The aggressor is justified under some other provision of this chapter or other
provision of law(2) Under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the person
whom he or she seeks to protect would not be justified in using such protective force; (3) The actor
was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of a forcible felony. 2. A
person shall not use deadly force upon another person under the circumstances specified in subsection
1 of this section unless: (1) He or she reasonably believes that such deadly force is necessary to
protect himself, or herself or her unborn child, or another against death, serious physical injury, or
any forcible felony; (2) Such force is used against a person who unlawfully enters, remains after
unlawfully entering, or attempts to unlawfully enter a dwelling, residence, or vehicle lawfully
occupied by such person; or (3) Such force is used against a person who unlawfully enters, remains
after unlawfully entering, or attempts to unlawfully enter private property that is owned or leased by
an individual, or is occupied by an individual who has been given specific authority by the property
owner to occupy the property, claiming a justification of using protective force under this section. 3.
A person does not have a duty to retreat: (1) From a dwelling, residence, or vehicle where the person
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demonstrate the reasonableness of his fear, Wilson characterized Brown as
demonic, crazed, and beyond control, while Wilson characterized himself as
vulnerable and fearing for his life, first in the police vehicle and moments later in
the street after he ordered the fleeing, shot, and bleeding Brown to halt. "Officer
Wilson then shot Brown repeatedly, according to his account, after Brown
continued to charge at him" through four separate rounds of gunfire and Wilson's
ordering Brown to get down on the ground. 71
Wilson's claim that Brown stared into his pointed weapon and dared him
to shoot, because he was too much of a "pussy," paradigmiatically exemplifies
racialized masculinity and sexuality on an intersectional implicit bias axis.
Essentially, Wilson claimed that Brown reduced him to a vulnerable feminized
orifice, ironically at the height of Wilson's power and potency, as his gun was
drawn. Wilson's comment encapsulates the manner in which racial ideologies
cleave gender norms, such that white men take on the traits of innocence,
vulnerability, and susceptibility to violence and violation, when faced with black
men who are perceived as dangerous, prone to violative behavior, in desperate
need of being controlled, and a threat to white masculinity and consequently white
heteropatriarchal order. Wilson's allegation typifies the manner in which black
men are hypermasculinized and hypersexualized, in ways that make them
vulnerable to police violence and justifiable homicide in order to maintain white
heteropatriarchal order."' It is these very time-worn themes of racialized sexuality
and masculinity that turned Wilson into victim and Brown into predator.
The reasonableness inquiry and implicit bias provide the perfect storm of
framing black vilification and white innocence. In the grip of implicit bias, the
black body itself becomes evidence of the crime and danger, and the white body
becomes evidence of innocence and righteousness. The gaze or lens of valor melds
with the white body and the gaze or lens of pathology never leaves the black body.
The implicit bias research, particularly the shooter bias studies, demonstrates an
endemic association between black people with dangerousness, regardless of
whether they are actually armed. 179 By way of illustration, and as Cynthia Lee
suggests, the overwhelming majority of race based implicit bias test takers are
is not unlawfully entering or unlawfully remaining; (2) From private property that is owned or leased
by such individual; or (3) If the person is in any other location such person has the right to be. 4. The
justification afforded by this section extends to the use of physical restraint as protective force
provided that the actor takes all reasonable measures to terminate the restraint as soon as it is
reasonable to do so. 5. The defendant shall have the burden of injecting the issue of justification
under this section. If a defendant asserts that his or her use of force is described under subdivision
(2) of subsection 2 of this section, the burden shall then be on the state to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not reasonably believe that the use of such force was necessary to defend
against what he or she reasonably believed was the use or imminent use of unlawful force. (L. 1977
S.B. 60, A.L. 1993 S.B. 180, A.L. 2007 S.B. 62 & 41, A.L. 2010 H.B. 1692, et al. merged with H.B.
2081, A.L.)).
I Bosman, supra note 61.
178 See Harris, supra note 14, at 16.
' Lee, supra note 140, at 1584 -85.
604 [Vol. 85:3
BIAS AND BROKEN BODIES
inclined to associate black people with danger, suspiciousness, and the need to be
controlled and if the majority are more likely to "see" a weapon in the hands of
unarmed Blacks than in the hands of comparable Whites and are therefore more
likely to shoot unarmed Blacks when they would not shoot comparable Whites,
then investigating officers, prosecutors, grand and petit jurors, judges, and the
public at large may be more inclined to find that a white officer who shot an
unarmed black person acted reasonably.'s Implicit bias research indicates that a
white officer perceives danger in a black body, even when mistaken."' This strong
tendency to associate Blacks with danger provides another structural and cultural
impediment to cases involving officer shootings of black people and the
willingness of investigators, prosecutors, jurors, judges, and the public to excuse a
police officer in the shooting death of an unarmed civilian.'82
I. Implicit Bias Frames the Way We See Evidence.
Like other crimes involving societally vulnerable victims, such as sex
trafficking, rape, or battered women's cases, implicit bias in police shootings
inverts, if not perverts, the established criminal justice system, not just with respect
to investigations and prosecutions, but also the relative value judgments made
between victims and perpetrators. Implicit bias has the weight and power to
reallocate the burdens of proof. As further evidence of the omnipresence of implicit
bias, its entrenchment, and the internalization of dominant discourses, the fact
finders in societally vulnerable victim cases render verdicts, true bills, and no bills
that reflect the relative value between victims and the accused-the relative value,
for example, of a white officer who protects and serves the societal order, or the
life of a dead black man who dog whistle politics has framed as a demon. 1' As
another example, jurors in the Rodney King trial had a "reverence for the police
officers as guardians of social order" and their "low regard for the likes of King-
a paroled felon, driving drunk and resisting arrest-made it inconceivable that they
could sympathize with him as the victim of the alleged crime."'84 In sum, implicit
bias frames the way we see the body of proof, the perception of racialized danger,
the innocence of Whites, and the pathology of Blacks.
180 Id.
181 See id.
182 See, e.g., James Pinkerton, Bulletproof Part 3: Hard to Charge, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/locallitem/Bulletproof-Part-3-Hard-to-charge-2442 1.php
(showing an example in Houston, Texas where local grand juries have cleared police of shooting
civilians 288 consecutive times).
183 Lawson, supra note 120, at 365.
184 Bob Sipchen, Analysis Backs Jury in Rodney King Trial, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 24, 1992),
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-09-24/news/vw-1191_1 rodney-king-trial (quoting D.M. Osborne
from the American Lawyer).
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The distinction between white heteropatriarchal space and vulnerable
bodied places is not just an issue of perception;18 1 it creates two different material
realities particularly with respect to white and black experiences with authority
generally and the police specifically. 18 6 It creates the circumstances under which
police officers enter white neighborhoods and interact with its citizens as "officer
friendly"; whereas, law enforcement engages battle tactics and guerrilla warfare in
"bad" - used as a proxy for "black" - neighborhoods. This variance in perception
and lived realities impacts jurors' perceptions of evidence in cases involving white
officers killing unarmed black people. The majority white grand jury proceedings,
like Wilson's where there were 9 white grand jurors, 6 men and 3 women, and 3
black, 1 man and 2 women, impact the perception of evidence, particularly the
vilification of Blacks and the over valorization of Whites.'87 Furthermore, an
additional structural impediment to indicting white officers who kill unarmed
black people exists because jurors often defer to the officer's credibility, giving the
1" Borrowing from Yi-Fu Tuan's distinction between space and place, America itself becomes the
racial battleground of white supremacy. See Yi-Fu TUAN, SPACE AND PLACE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF
EXPERIENCE 5-7 (Univ. of Minn. Press 1977). In its basic operations, white heteropatriarchy usurps
and totalizes all space and relegates specific bodies to places where the conditions of vulnerability to
exploitation abound and ensnarl. Id. In a classic example, the Dred Scott decision denied citizenship
to Blacks, leaving them without access to the courts or any form of justice and therefore vulnerable
to exploitation for both purposes of labor and sex. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
186 BENJAMIN B. RINGER & ELINOR R. LAWLESS, RACE-ETHNICITY AND SOCIETY 21, 87, 88, 91, 93-
94, 95-97, 99, 100-01, 103, 104-05 (1989). These differing substratas with their attendant set of
divergent norms and rules create divergent material realities and perceptions between Blacks and
Whites. For example, in one poll involving the radically divergent racial perceptions of the Brown
shooting, 23 percent of Whites believed that Brown was racially profiled, compared with 64 percent
of Blacks. By contrast, 77 percent of Whites believed race did not factor into the shooting and 72
percent of Whites stated Wilson should not be arrested or charges. Seventy-one percent of Blacks,
however, indicated that Wilson should have been arrested and charged with a crime. Jamelle Bouie,
Tale of Two Fergusons, SLATE (Sept. 16, 2014, 5:47 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/politics/2014/09/st-louis-blacks-and-white disag
reeon_michaelbrown-s killingholdalmost.html.
In another poll, 39 percent of Whites believed that Blacks are "unfairly targeted by law enforcement,"
compared with 70 percent of Blacks. Moreover, 71 percent of Whites believed Saint Louis County
Prosecutor Bob McCulloch was fair and impartial. Id.
'
8 7 Derrick Clifton, There's Already a Serious Problem with the Michel Brown Trial, IDENTITIES.MIC
(Aug. 26, 2014), http://mic.com/articles/97232/there-s-already-a-serious-problem-with-the-michael-
brown-trial#.9VacccDkJ. According to a Pew research Center study nearly twice as many Blacks as
Whites believed that Wilson's case "raises an important issue about race," 80% to 44%. Id. When
asked about how fairly the Wilson's case would be evaluated only 18% of Blacks indicated
confidence compared to 52% of Whites. Id. Power structures in suburbs that transitioned to majority-
black populations remain overwhelmingly white. Nickolas Kaplan, The Fire (This) Time: Ferguson,
Implicit Bias, and the Michael Brown Grand Jury, 20 PUB. INT. L. REP. 52, 54 (2014). Ferguson, for
instance, has a white mayor, a 6-white-i-Hispanic school board that recently suspended a black
superintendent, one black City Council member, and a six percent black police force. Id. This is
compounded by a municipal revenue scheme over-reliant on traffic citations by mostly white officers
against black drivers: 86 percent of stops, 92 percent of searches, and 93 percent arrests in 2013 were
of black drivers. Id. The grand jury thus replicates Ferguson's demographic power imbalance. Id.
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reasonableness of the use of force additional bite. Although there are jury
instructions and voir dire practices to prevent jurors from over valuing the
testimony of an officer, no such instruction was provided to the grand jury in the
Wilson case.
VII. IMPLICIT BIAS IN THE WILSON GRAND
JURY PROCEEDINGS
The Wilson grand jury proceedings exemplify the inversion of order and
the reallocation of the burden of proof when rules of evidence and legal definitions
of "reason" are so laden with white heteropatriarchal assumptions about guilt,
innocence, and danger. The prosecution torpedoed and jettisoned the state's ability
to prove improper use of force, despite there being sufficient evidence to obtain a
true bill, and despite the common wisdom that even a "ham sandwich" could be
indicted by a vigorous prosecutor. Typically, again referencing the 99% success
rates for prosecutors in obtaining true bills, the prosecution presents to the grand
jury evidence establishing probable cause to believe that a target has committed a
crime. By contrast, at trial, the prosecution puts on its case-in-chief, which is
evidence establishing the defendant's guilt by a reasonable doubt standard of
proof. In the Wilson grand jury proceedings, however, the prosecution inverted the
process and presented the grand jurors with Wilson's case-in-chief. Arguably, the
prosecution put on a defense of Wilson that was much better than any case-in chief
Wilson's defense attorney could have presented at a trial. The prosecutors failed
to guide the grand jury through the recommendation of charges; whereas at trial,
the presiding trial judge would read the indictment to the petit jurors at the outset
of the trial and then provide jury instructions to the jurors before they began their
deliberations. Although the prosecution failed to provide a charging
recommendation against Wilson, they provided a statute more favorable to his
defense that was unconstitutional and enabled that statute to act as a filter for two
months as the grand jurors heard evidence. In a trial, the erroneous statute would
be subject to the adversarial process and challenge, where the prosecution (if it had
a will to convict) could readily challenge the accuracy of the statute during a jury
instruction conference and/or by way of motion. Moreover, had the case proceeded
to trial, the evidence and particularly Wilson's testimony would have been subject
to the Rules of Evidence and cross-examination. In the grand jury proceeding, the
prosecution not only allowed Wilson to testify, but prosecutors gave him four
hours to present his narrative, to frame the evidence around his narrative, and to
be emancipated and liberated from the truth serum and elixir of cross-examination
(challenge), which is particularly conspicuous when the prosecutors could have
used the opportunity to create impeachment materials for trial against Wilson, and
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further contrasted markedly from the prosecution's rigorous cross-examination of
its own witnesses. 188
Though it might be tempting, then, to frame the issue solely through the
lens of prosecutorial competence and discretion, such a framing implies that
another prosecutor could do better. Yet the indictment and conviction rates of
officers accused of excessive force indicates that other prosecutors do not do better.
Here is where the analysis of implicit bias becomes central, for, it is in the
prosecution of these cases that the "implicit" becomes "explicit" and material,
embedded in the structure and practice of legal institutions beyond the
particularities of who is at the helm. In the case of Wilson and Brown, three
instances amply demonstrate this process of concretization.
First, it must be noted that Wilson benefited from the previously described
anti-black, pro-police biases from the moment additional officers arrived at the
scene of the shooting. Wilson's supervisor arrived at the scene; took Wilson's
story, which was never documented; tried Wilson at the scene, determined his level
of guilt, and let Wilson leave the scene with literal blood on his hands that he was
allowed to wash off without being questioned or processed at the murder scene.1 8 9
Wilson's supervisor later explained that he sent Wilson home without being
interviewed or processed because of the "hostile" crowd;'90 but given that the
crowd did nothing to indicate a threatening or violent intent, the supervisor's fear
of the crowd may also indicate his own biases regarding black criminality and
"dangerous neighborhoods." The result is that Brown was declared guilty and
Wilson announced innocent at the murder scene itself, a fact that would hamper
future prosecution.
In his post-incident interview and in his testimony to the grand jury,
Wilson repeatedly referred to what he called "aggression" from Brown. He
testified that he told the unarmed Brown to step back from his police vehicle three
times, twice Brown responded by slamming the SUV door on Wilson and the third
time, Brown assaulted him "swinging wildly," yet pausing briefly to hand a
package to Dorian Johnson, his companion, and then continuing to punch the
armed Wilson."' Despite photographs revealing relatively minor redness and no
visible scaring on the left side of his face, Wilson claimed that he had to pull his
weapon, because Brown could have killed him with a single blow: "I felt that
another one of those punches in my face could knock me out or worse. I mean it
181 See OFFICES OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL § 9-11.152, (2012), available at https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-11000-grand-
jury#9- 11.152 (states that "under normal circumstances, where no burden upon the grand jury or
delay of its proceedings is involved, reasonable request by a 'subject' or 'target' or an investigation,
as defined above, to testify personally before the grand jury ordinarily should be given favorable
consideration . . . ."). Mr. Wilson was not rigorously cross-examined, while other witnesses were
subject to extensive and aggressive cross-examination.
189 Memorandum, supra note 11, at 15.
190 M, e
191 Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13.
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was, he's obviously bigger than I was and stronger and the, I've already taken two
to the face and I didn't think I would, the third one could be fatal if he hit me right."
As yet another incident of the prosecution abandoning its cross-examining
function, the prosecution failed to ask Wilson about the reasonableness of his
perception of danger, when his claims about Brown punching him in the face to
the point where he feared death did not square with the post-shooting photos of
Wilson showing relatively minor, at best, injuries. 19 2
Wilson stated he was carrying mace, a baton, and a flashlight; but he did
not believe non-lethal force options would be effective. His gun, he said, was the
only option. As Wilson pointed his gun at Brown and warned Brown that he would
shoot, according to Wilson, Brown stared into his brandished and pointed weapon,
refused to heed his warning, and stated: "You are too much of a pussy to shoot."'
According to Wilson, Brown's size and strength coupled with his standing outside
the SUV made Wilson completely vulnerable despite Wilson's being armed and
seated in an SUV. Again, according to Wilson, Brown responded to being shot the
first time by becoming enraged, that Brown "looked like a demon," and Brown
then put his head and arms back into the SUV and assaulted Wilson again. Wilson
claimed that after he chased Brown, Brown turned around toward the armed
Wilson appearing "psychotic," "hostile," and "crazy," as though he was "looking
through" Wilson. Wilson claimed, after being shot at least once and after being
chased by Wilson, Brown made a "grunting noise" and with what Wilson described
as the "most intense aggressive face" that he had ever seen on a person, Brown
then made a hop-like movement, and charged at Wilson. According to Wilson,
while Brown reached for his waistband, which Wilson thought might be an attempt
to retrieve a weapon,1 94 Wilson fired multiple shots and told Brown to get on the
ground, to which Brown responded by briefly pausing and then charging at Wilson
again with his hand in his waistband. According to Wilson, Brown charged at him
three more times. Wilson fired a total of twelve shots.1 95
1 See Goldwasser, supra note 26, at 54 n. 49. (pointing out, "Wilson's injuries consisted of scratches
on his neck and relatively minor bruising and swelling of his right jaw, resulting in jaw pain, for
which an anti-inflammatory and some ice were prescribed.")
193 Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13-14.
194 Memorandum, supra note 11, at 82. A black man allegedly reaching for a gun is a perennial claim
in many unarmed shooting cases.
" Id. at 16. As further evidence of the manner in which pseudospeciation not only plays itself out in
material reality, as exemplified in Brown's case, but also creates a reality, in August 2014, Fox News
reporter Holly Mckay, reported that a "well placed source" confirmed that Wilson suffered a
fractured eye socket from the scuffle with Brown. Hollie McKay, Missouri Cop Was Badly Beaten
Before Shooting Michael Brown, Says Source, Fox NEWS (Aug. 20, 2014),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/08/20/missouri-cop-was-badly-beaten-before-shooting-michael-
brown-says-source.html. Wilson himself claimed that he had been severely injured in the scuffle.
The photos released of Wilson, during his medical exam immediately following the scuffle, however,
at best showed some redness but no serious injury. Wilson and one other witness stated that Brown
charged Wilson, again after the first shots. Sixteen other witness stated that Brown looked as if he
was trying to surrender, and had his arms raised in the air when Wilson fatally shot him.
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When Wilson testified that Brown looked like Hulk Hogan, the
prosecutors failed to challenge Wilson about his relative height, weight, and
strength, providing added legitimation to Wilson's perception of Brown as
demonic, aggressive, hostile, and crazy; this was an opportunity to bring the
subconscious workings of implicit bias to light, and proclaim their impropriety as
a basis for officers' use of force.197 Further extending the wild, uncontrollable,
animalistic image of Brown, Wilson testified that Brown just started hitting him
through the window. The prosecutors failed to question the plausibility of a young
black male hitting and assaulting an armed police officer in a police vehicle, let
alone the photographs of Wilson after the incident that failed to reflect bruising
from Hulk Hogan hitting him twice in the face. Similarly, the prosecution declined
to question Wilson about Brown's pausing long enough during his assault of
Wilson, armed and seated in an SUV, to hand Johnson the cigarillos. The
prosecution chose not to challenge Wilson about his claim that Brown ran through
bullets. They failed to probe how Wilson's testimony failed to align with the
forensics, dispatch, and autopsy reports; instead, they allowed Wilson to construct
his own narrative. The prosecution failed to have Wilson explain what he meant
when he stated that Brown's community was not well liked, possibly leaving grand
jurors to ponder whether Brown's neighborhood provided fodder for a probable
cause determination to use force - whether Brown's neighborhood itself provided
evidence of probable cause and dangerousness itself. Beyond the testimony itself,
the prosecutors used Wilson's testimony as the fulcrum of the presentation,
spending the next three months buttressing Wilson's testimony with witnesses that
corroborated his story."'
Moreover, the Wilson grand jury proceeding illustrates the problematic
nature of allowing the alleged character of a neighborhood to lead to an inference
of a justified use of force."' The proceedings demonstrate the legal creation of
196 Paul Rosenberg, Everything the Darren Wilson grand jury got wrong: The lies, errors and
mistruths that let Michael Brown's killer off the hook, SALON (Nov. 26, 2014, 2:45 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2014/11/26/everythingthedarren wilsongrandjurygot wrongthelies
and mistruths that let michael browns killer off the-hook/.
197 See Memorandum, supra note 11, at 14.
'
9 Bosman, supra note 61. Moreover, as Goldwasser illustrates, the prosecution directly contributed
to Wilson's characterization of Brown as out of control, dangerous, suspicious, and in need of being
controlled by presenting toxicology reports and witnesses about Brown's marijuana use and the
subsequent possibility of hallucinations, paranoia, and psychosis that may have resulted from such
use. Goldwasser, supra note 26, at 48. Goldwasser also points out that the prosecution asked several
witnesses about the possibility that Brown had taken "wax," a highly potent form of marijuana, before
the shooting although there was no basis for the questions in the record. Id. Two points bear repeating
here: (1) the prosecution provided a better defense for Wilson in the grand jury proceedings than he
ever would have received at trial and (2) as Anthony Farley argues lavishing Brown's body with
narcotics use branded his body a site for social ills that justified the use of force. See Farley, supra
note 2, at 475.
19 Such inferences are not without legal precedent. In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Supreme Court held
that an individual's presence in in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, was not
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vulnerability to excessive police force by (1) branding the neighborhood as "bad"
and (2) allowing that branding to affect the reasonableness inquiry, and by
extension reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Using Farley's insights,
lavishing Brown's body and his neighborhood with drug use, danger, and
suspiciousness branded both his body and surrounding area as a site for social ills
that justified the use of force. This branding is particularly effective where the
matrix of implicit bias advantaged Wilson over Brown, particularly with respect
to presumed criminality and innocence. Marking Brown's neighborhood as an
indicia of criminality not only reinforces implicit bias, it allows white
heteropatriarchy to become the law, to do its work, and to subsidize its efforts.
What makes Wilson's story palpable and what makes his narrative
resonate as "reasonable" is framing Brown as a demon and himself as innocent,
vulnerable, and the only means of establishing order at the site of chaos.2 00
Wilson's narrative and frame, moreover, resonated for the investigators,
prosecutors, grand jurors, and many common viewers of the American scene.
VIM. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
With implicit bias anchored in the very structure of the mind, the black
body becomes synonymous with pathology and the white body instantaneously
reflective of innocence. Implicit bias is itself evidence of crime, such that even
where the black body is engaged in innocence, it is perceived as treacherous; where
it exercises brilliance, it is measured as mediocre; and where it is valiant, it is
framed as diabolical. By contrast, the white body becomes synonymous with
righteousness. It is itself evidence of innocence, such that where it engages in
enough to support a reasonable, particularize suspicion that the person is committing a crime. Illinois
v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 119 (2000). But officers are not required to ignore the relevant
characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to
warrant further investigation. Id. Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop
occurred in a "high crime area" among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.
See id. at 119-20. Similarly, in Whren, the Court noted that the defendant was in a "high drug area,"
in fashioning its bulwark against inquiries into pretextuality and subjective motivations for stopping
citizens where they have also committed traffic violations. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
808 (1996). Ostensibly, "high drug areas, areas of suspected criminal activity, and bad neighborhoods
would not include places where doctors may be overprescribing opioids or illegally providing them
without a prescription.
200 It should be noted that "being threatened" is the domain of white heteropatriarchy and does not
extend to Marrisa Alexander, a battered black wife, who fired a warning shot at her abusive husband
(to make him get out of the house), and whose Stand Your Ground motion was denied. See Stephen
A. Crockett, Jr., Marissa Alexander Released from Prison, THE RooT (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://www.theroot.com/articles/news/2015/01/marissaalexander-releasedfromprison/).
Similarly, Trayvon Martin was not entitled to public space nor was he allowed to be a child being
stalked by Zimmerman, assuming honorary whiteness. White heteropatriarchy usurps and totalizes
the field of victimhood and relegates black bodies to places of perpetrators, where their suffering and
victimization is rendered invisible.
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treachery, it is perceived as innocent; where it exercises mediocrity, it is measured
as brilliant; and where it is diabolical, it is justified as valiant. This dichotomy
forms the pathological gaze and the gaze of over-valorization, which dictate that
the black body is always seen as embodying pathology and the white body is
always viewed as righteous regardless of the proof and irrespective of the context.
Black demonry and white innocence are not only the lens through which we see
evidence, they become the evidence itself, existing long before the actual proof.
Once declared the site of menace (which occurs upon first sighting), the black
body, like the black neighborhood, becomes vulnerable to the performance of
white heteropatriarchy, the unleashing of anxiety on the canvass of black flesh in
order to mangle, but more importantly to declare shared triumph, vindication,
safety, and security. White heteropatriarchy usurps the function of the law in order
to hide, obfuscate, and exact its agenda, which is the control, subjugation, and
domination of the black body, legitimated through operations of law, like the grand
jury proceeding in the Wilson case. Within the law, white heteropatriarchy is
highly adaptable. It grafts onto the law, creating its own imperceptibility and
relentlessly transformative nature, rendering its operations innocent, hidden,
undetectable, and seemingly natural.20 '
Any solutions to the problem of white heteropatriarchal omnipresence,
entrenchment, and inevitability must be as equally robust and comprehensive as
the problem of white heteropatriarchy itself. Ferguson and the democratization of
public discourse made possible through revolutionary increases in technology
ignited a firestorm of "national dialogue on systemic racism in policing, the justice
system, media discourse... social institutions" and cultural representations.202
Implicit bias research instructs that the reasonableness inquiry for excessive use of
police force cases is a centralized repository and haven for racialized bias, inviting
frameworks that establish criminality based on blackness and innocence hinging
on whiteness. As a direct result, and as Cynthia Lee argues, the only way to disrupt
the problems of implicit bias is to make race salient, as opposed to deluding
ourselves into thinking that we have achieved post-racialism, which like
21 Some critiques more sympathetic to the absence of a true bill in the Wilson proceedings have
argued that legal scholars who criticize the Wilson adjudication have not advanced the evidence that
would have established Wilson's guilt by a probable cause standard, let alone a reasonable doubt
standard. In response to that observation, however, we unfortunately do not know what the
prosecution's case in chief would look like against Wilson because the prosecution elected to present
a better case in chief for Wilson than he would have otherwise received had the case proceeded to
trial. For example, we have yet to see what the charging recommendations would have been (had
there been a will to prosecute), what impact unsullied witnesses would have made, what demeanor
evidence would have been produced had Wilson been rigorously cross examined, or what
contradictory statements Wilson would have made had he been challenged. Furthermore, during the
course of the proceedings, the prosecution produced impactful amounts of Brady and Giglio materials
that would severely undermine the prosecutions witnesses had the case proceeded to trial. In short,
there is an argument that we simply do not know what the evidence would have been had there been
an unfettered will to prosecute.
202 Kaplan, supra note 187, at 56.
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colorblindness silences any remedial effort and places white heteropatriarchy far
beyond remedial reach.203 In that vein, omnipresent, ubiquitous, full, open, candid,
inexhaustible, and complete vetting of white heteropatriarchy is mandated in order
to arrest its effects and to make its operations known and knowable for purposes
of correction. 204 A thorough investigation, indictment, conviction, and sentencing
of white heteropatriarchy are centuries long overdue.
A sustained and comprehensive national conversation, such as that being
pushed by organizations affiliated with Black Lives Matter, may lead to the
political mobilization that eventually mitigated the societal practice of
lynchings.205 A legal strategy, if there is one, is not enough. Sustained dialogue and
activism vetting the omnipresent, entrenched operations of white heteropatriarchy
elicits the ears of prosecutors,2 06 judges, policy makers, and legislative actors, in
addition to incentivizing political action. Political discourse makes carceral policy.
Willie Horton and black demagoguery built a political consensus that led to action.
So too, a sustained and highly public discourse about the operations of white
heteropatriarchy has the potential to enlighten and change both the public and legal
discourse. Judges listen. Police unions listen. Prosecutors listen. At a bare
minimum, police unions now know to tell their affiliates to coordinate their stories
with the available body and dashboard camera videos before they provide
statements, particularly documented interviews. Such attentiveness might also lead
to more proactive measures to eliminate the problems of implicit bias throughout
the ranks. White heteropatriarchy cannot be talked about, theorized,
problematized, nor discussed enough.207
203 Lee, supra note 140, at 1609-10.
204 If Michel Foucault is correct in that "power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial
part of itself' and "[i]ts success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms[,]" then
unmasking, unraveling, revealing, and deconstructing power is mandatory in order to render it
intolerable and woefully unsuccessful. MICHEL FoUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VoL. 1: AN
INTRODUCTION 86 (1976).
205 Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins ofModern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REv. 48, 60
(2000).
206 See, e.g., Leon Neyfakh, Big Wins for Black Lives Matter, SLATE (March 16, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news and_politics/crime/2016/03/the_prosecutors inthe tamirrice
andlaquanmcdonald cases lose their primary.html. As a direct result of effective political
organizing, the Black Lives Matters Movement has successfully mobilized voters and prompted the
overthrow of two key prosecutors: Cook County state's attorney Anita Alvarez, who waited 13
months to bring charges against the Chicago police officer who shot Laquan McDonald, unarmed
black youth, 16 times and Cuyahoga County district attorney Tim McGinty, who oversaw the grand
jury proceedings that led to a no true bill against the officers responsible for the homicide of 12-year-
old Tamir Rice. Id.
207 Far from criticizing the media as the source of the problem for the national uprisings protesting
excessive use of police force, the increased media coverage of these events has galvanized increased
political discourse and activism that has successfully led to the ouster of two life-long prosecutors in
Cook County, Illinois, and Cleveland, Ohio, the Laquan McDonald and Tamir Rice cases
respectively, raising a political reckoning that led to successful public office removal. Exhaustive
media coverage allows sunlight to act as natures greatest antiseptic in excessive use of force cases
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In order to circumvent the work of white heteropatriarchy in the criminal
justice system, particularly in the area of police shootings, I suggest several
solutions, three of which I discuss in some detail. However, in addition to these
three, I also endorse mandatory implicit bias training throughout the ranks of law
enforcement to include local law enforcement, federal agents, and state and federal
prosecutors. Training should, at a minimum, make law enforcement much more
critically aware of the operations of race, as well as class and gender, in their
decision-making and exercise of authority. Implicit bias training should be
mandatory at the National Advocacy Center, the national training facility for the
nation's federal prosecutors, the highest form of law enforcement in whom the
well-being of the nation is entrusted. Making law enforcement critically aware of
and most importantly accountable for its implicit bias is imperative in order to
ameliorate its effects.
I realize that many argue that making officers aware of racism in the
exercise of police power or increased surveillance of officers increases crime
because officers are inhibited from doing their jobs. These arguments, however,
are prima facie problematic. In fact, these statements embody the very nature of
the problem itself, an unbridled claim of white heteropatriarchal privilege and
entitlement to perform on the canvasses of black flesh. It cannot be that officers
need a fair margin of error, to include unarmed shootings of blacks, in order to do
their jobs or that increased scrutiny inhibits officers' willingness to engage crime.
It cannot be that officers need 20 unarmed black killings for every one million
successful arrests or that we remove "public" from service in order to give officers
the apparent secrecy and clandestine arrangements they need to police "bad" black
areas, whose very nomenclature may appear redundant to them. The claim that
these unarmed shootings are a necessary evil when policing black pathology is
problematic at a bare minimum. The sheer number of murders of black persons by
white officers and the lack of convictions for these instances of violence makes the
case for greater diversity throughout the ranks of law enforcement and the criminal
justice system to include police officers, state troopers, federal agents, prosecutors,
judges, and jurors. I realize, however, that white heteropatriarchy uses
"unqualified" and "unacceptable" as proxies for racism, making greater
employment diversity a thing hoped for, but yet unseen, particularly through the
lens of implicit bias.
I also endorse body and dashboard cameras, which will lend credibility to
the claims of the vulnerable, pathologized, and framed as lacking in believability.
The same white supremacy, white heteropatriarchy, and implicit and explicit bias
that kills black bodies also refuses to believe black bodies. Although not
dispositive, as in the case of Eric Gamer, video provides another body of proof and
subjects excessive use of force to the natural antiseptic of sunlight. Brown's death
was not captured on a body or dashboard camera, but had it been, it may have
and it better positions citizens to seize the political process in order to make prosecutors accountable
for their decisions, actions, measures of stealth, and good and bad faith.
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protected the integrity and credibility of both killer and victim. Like other evidence
retention policies, the retention of these videos can be negotiated and balanced
against the needs of law enforcement for storage space, like all forms of evidence
retention.
In order to overcome the structural conflict of interest in having law
enforcement investigate and prosecute law enforcement, there should be special
investigators and prosecutors with increased scrutiny by the DOJ Civil Rights
Division in all cases involving excessive use of force. The special prosecutors and
investigators should comprise distinct departments and divisions with clear chains
of command separate and apart from the targets of their investigations and
prosecutions. Some scholars, activists, and commentators have argued that
excessive use of force cases should, of necessity, be presented in a preliminary
hearing before ajudge under public scrutiny, rather than a secretive and clandestine
grand jury operation. This partial solution necessitates some debate; however, it is
not the mechanism of the grand jury, per se, that is the problem, but rather the will
and desire of the prosecutor.2 08 As I have argued throughout this piece, grand juries
are significantly structured to the distinct advantage of the prosecution, which is a
well desired boon in difficult prosecutions when there is a will to convict
ultimately. Just as the grand jury process can be manipulated to undermine a
prosecution, it can also be used to bulwark an adjudication. Prosecutors can use
the secrecy of a grand jury to protect the identity of witnesses, their credibility, as
well as their stories. For example, in grand jury proceedings, prosecutors can
prepare statements for their witnesses to read subject to their review for complete
veracity, which enables the witness to produce consistent narratives under oath that
can later be used at trial, particularly where the consistency of their claims are
under siege. A preliminary hearing, on the other hand, subjects witnesses to often
rigorous cross-examination, particularly at the risk of creating Brady and Giglio
materials. Moreover, the prosecutorial discretion afforded prosecutors in grand
juries allows them to laser focus the evidence necessary to establish probable cause
liberated from the Rules of Evidence, Brady, Giglio, and suppression problems. In
short, grand juries provide a well-suited vehicle for prosecution, again, where there
is a desire to obtain charges and convictions. 20 9 These structural advantages should
not be lightly abandoned in excessive use of force cases; however, special
prosecutors and investigators with greater DOJ oversight might eliminate the
208 It should also be noted that in federal criminal proceedings, the Fifth Amendment mandates that
felony charges be brought by grand jury indictment. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
209 Goldwasser, supra note 26, at 50 (explaining the prosecutorial will, or lack thereof in the Wilson
proceeding, Goldwasser suggests that McCulloch deliberately used the grand jury, as opposed to a
preliminary hearing or the filing of information, because it would ensure secrecy; unmitigated
prosecutorial discretion; discretionary cross examination, allowing Wilson to provide his narrative
without challenge and framed by favorable evidence and law; and perhaps most importantly, political
cover because the citizens, in the form of the grand jurors, would be responsible for the absence of a
true bill).
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inherent conflict of interest of law enforcement investigating and prosecuting its
own, as well as ensuring, perhaps, a greater will to pursue convictions zealously.
The idea, therefore, is not to cavalierly abandon the grand jury process, but to
demand greater accountability and higher standards of fairness. Special
prosecutors as well as investigators with enhanced DOJ oversight would at a bare
minimum ameliorate the structural conflicts of interest when law enforcement
investigate and prosecute their own.2 10
In addition to the aforementioned solutions, I also suggest as curatives the
following:
A. Local Police Department Reporting Requirements to Federal Agencies
Disrupting the societal problem of police shooting unarmed persons
mandates a legally mandated national database accessible to the public. In order to
make known and knowable the full extent of the problem, a federal agency, like
the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) or the DOJ should gather legally
mandated data to record the number of police shootings-fatal and nonfatal-per
year, as well the race and gender demographics of both the victim and the
perpetrator.2 11
210 As an ancillary matter beyond the purview of the instant article, the prosecutorial treatment that
Darren Wilson received - the arguable affirmative action - stands as a paradigmatic corrective and
remedy to wrongful convictions and mass incarceration. If every defendant received what Wilson
received during the course of his investigation and prosecution, the numbers of wrongful convictions
and convictions generally would greatly dwindle. If defendants are allowed to leave the scene of the
crime without being processed; if defendants are provided attorneys from the very outset of the
investigation; if defendants can be shielded from making any statements at the scene of the crime or
outside the presence of an attorney concretely and far beyond Miranda; if the defendants receive all
of the evidence, not merely the discovery, within days of the incident; if defendants are allowed to
testify in the grand jury free of any challenge and the Rules of Evidence, as well as having the added
benefit of being able to coordinate their story with all of the evidence before providing testimony; if
their narratives are framed by supporting witnesses before they begin to testify; if corroborating
evidence and exculpatory materials are used to corroborate their claims during and after they testify;
if the prosecutors endeavor to create and permit narratives that resonate for the grand jurors at the
deepest layers of their conscious and subconscious minds; if the prosecutors refrain from providing
charging recommendations; if the prosecutors provide the legal defenses for the defendants at the
outset of the grand jury proceedings, particularly without the possible charges that defendant may
have committed; if the prosecutors submit the grand jurors to a deluge of all the evidence without
guidance or direction as to possible charges at the outset; such practices would greatly diminish over-
criminalization, particularly of the truly innocent.
211 See Wesley Lowery, How many police shootings a year? No one knows, WASH. POST (Sept. 8,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/08/how-many-police-
shootings-a-year-no-one-knows/ (quoting D. Brian Burghart, editor and publisher of Reno News &
Review and creator of the Fatal Encounters project, as saying: "One of the government's major jobs
is to protect us. How can it protect us if it doesn't know what the best practices are? If it doesn't
know if one local department is killing people at a higher rate than others? When it can't make
decisions based on real numbers to come up with best practices?").
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[W]hile the federal government and national research groups keep
data and statistics- on topics ranging from how many people
were victims of unprovoked shark attacks (53 in 2013) to the
number of hogs and pigs living on farms in the United States
(upwards of 64,000,000 according to 2010 numbers) - there is
no reliable national data on how many people are shot by police
officers each year.212
The DOJ does not maintain a "comprehensive database or record of police
shootings, instead allowing the nation's more than 17,000 law enforcement
agencies to self-report officer-involved shootings as part of the FBI's annual data
on 'justifiable homicides' by law enforcement." 213 DOJ, however, stopped
releasing these numbers because they were deemed unreliable.2 14 Moreover, least
we engage the trick of post-racialism and believe that race is just an idea to be
overcome by being ignored; this legally mandated record gathering should be
further delineated by, among other things, race as well as gender. White
heteropatriarchal performance in racialized police violence, investigations, and
adjudications is equally applicable to both black men and women; however,
thoroughly delineated data would present an opportunity to analyze the
distinctiveness of black men's and women's experiences with police violence-
"uniquely informed by race, gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation ...
"215
According to the executive director of the Police Executive Research
Forum, a comprehensive database of police shootings would enable law
enforcement to analyze when police force is authorized; thereby, potentially
leading to policy changes that might ameliorate unnecessary and unjustifiable use
of force.216 An accurate record of police shootings would provide a complete and
comprehensive study of police use of lethal force nationally. This assessment
would create a baseline number or rate, from which states and the federal
government might devise legislation to address excessive use of force.
Furthermore, this publically accessible information may place pressure on law
enforcement to adopt new policies that ameliorate the number of unarmed police
shootings and incentivize them to exercise better discretion. However, we cannot
stop there. The new laws and policies adopted must progressively seek to diminish
212 Id
2 13  
d
2 14  d
215 See KIMBERLE' W. CRENSHAW & ANDREA J. RITCHIE, AFRICAN AM. POLICY FORUM, SAY HER
NAME: RESISTING POLICE BRUTALITY AGAINST BLACK WOMEN 3 (2015), available at
http://staticl.squarespace.com/static/53f20d90e4b0b80451158d8c/t/55a81 0d7e4b058f342f55873/1
437077719984/AAPF SMN Brief fullsingles.compressed.pdf.216 Lowery, supra note 211.
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the practice of over-policing, over-surveilling, and over-incarcerating bodies of
color.
B. National Database of Local and Federal Prosecutions of Police Shootings
Disaggregated data is needed at local, state, and federal levels by sex, race,
reason for police interaction, assault, or death. The data should reflect the
intersectionality of the police interactions and shootings. Along the lines of
reporting requirements for police departments, the absence of indictments and
convictions in cases involving police shooting unarmed persons requires a legally
mandated national database accessible to the public that catalogues indictments
and conviction rates of law enforcement shootings. As sunshine may be the one of
the greatest antiseptics and in order to make known and knowable the full extent
of the problem involving juror reluctance to indict and convict law enforcement
who shoot the unarmed, as well as prosecutors who are loathed to seek indictments
and solid convictions, a federal agency should gather legally mandated data to
record the number of indictments, no true bills, convictions, and acquittals of
police shootings-fatal and nonfatal-per year, as well as the race and gender
demographics of both the victim and the perpetrator. A comprehensive database of
adjudications would enable prosecutors and policy makers to analyze both the
grand jury and trial process where police are defendants accused in a shooting;
thereby, potentially leading to policy changes that might address the sometimes
questionable use of grand juries to vindicate law enforcement and the trial
dynamics that may lead to acquittals.2 17 An accurate record of indictments and
convictions would provide a complete and comprehensive study of grand jury and
trial processes nationally. This assessment would create a baseline number or rate,
from which state and federal might devise corrective policy measures as well as
the remedial grand jury process and trial strategies surrounding excessive use of
force cases, i.e., voir dire questions that screen for implicit bias. Furthermore, this
publically accessible information may place pressure on prosecutor offices to
adopt new policies that ameliorate the questionable number of no true bills and
possible convictions and incentivize them to exercise better diligence and even
perhaps, diversity in their hiring.2 18
217 See id.
218 "Sixty-six percent of states that elect prosecutors have no blacks in those offices... .About 95
percent of the 2,437 elected state and local prosecutors across the country in 2014 were white ....
The study also found that 16 percent of elected prosecutors were white women, 4 percent were
minority men and 1 percent were minority women .... 'What this shows us is that, in the context of
a growing crisis that we all recognize in criminal justice in this country, we have a system where
incredible power and discretion is concentrated in the hands of one demographic group,' said Brenda
Choresi Carter of the Women Donors Network, who led the study." Nicholas Fandos, A Study
Documents the Paucity ofBiackElected Prosecutors: Zero in Most States, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2105),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/07/us/a-study-documents-the-paucity-of-black-elected-
prosecutors-zero-in-most-states.html?_r-OId.
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The absence of data gathering arguably allows the problems of police
violence to persist. The absence of record keeping provides additional protection
from both the scrutiny and detection that might motivate corrective action.
Conversely, the use of record keeping might incentivize correction, particularly
where it might prompt public shaming, whereby law enforcement is subjected to
the shame of their numbers and data. This publically accessible information would
also enable the electorate to hold its public officials accountable, much like the
events that saw the toppling of prosecutors in Cook County Illinois and Cleveland,
Ohio after the LaQuan McDonald and Tamir Rice cases respectively. The data
would provide a context in which to place these cases and would allow for the
drawing of analogies and symmetries between excessive use of force cases with
greater accuracy that can potentially lead to better policy. As an added benefit, data
can bring these cases into high relief, giving them the high profile that necessitates
greater transparency, answering the questions what do prosecutors do and how do
grand juries operate, all of which enhances the democratic accountability of
prosecutors in particular, but may have a subsequent trickling effect throughout
the ranks of law enforcement.
Like CompStat, which focuses on using dynamic data of criminal activity
in specific areas to target resources, triage, and increase oversight, massive data
gathering would allow policy makers and the public to scrutinize those counties
and/or police departments that manage to avoid high numbers of excessive force
cases as well as those that appear particularly problematic and to ask what appears
to be working and what is flawed. The same logic and justifications for CompStat
would also apply to prosecutors' offices and their handling of these cases.
This data gathering might substantiate the hidden assumptions that "Black
Lives Matter" challenge, particularly that blackness is not life and that black life
does not matter as evidenced in the disproportionate number of blacks killed by
white officers as well as the converse, the absence of disproportionate whites killed
by black officers, particularly white women murdered by black male officers. Such
evidence might also substantiate the claim that "White Lives Matter," further
undermining the claim that "All Lives Matter." Even for those that are skeptical
about the influence of race, white supremacy, or white heteropatriarchy in the
instances of police encounters, data gathering might be an initial remedy. Such
data might lead to systemic changes in policing that impact everyone. There is a
clear argument that the number of police shootings generally is far too high to be
cognized and that systemic changes are necessary to remediate the large numbers
of police shootings and instances of excessive use of force across the board. In
keeping with Derrick Bell's interest convergence,2 19 the data can be used to
219 Derrick Bell's interest convergence theory posits that any corrective action benefits to blacks are
incidental to, and contingent upon, benefits that whites receive; blacks will only receive corrective
remedy when white interests are implicated and assuaged; that corrective action often masks the
implicit norm of whiteness and white privilege, which allows the subtle reification of white
supremacy and white heteropatriarchy by producing the same racial norms and codes of behavior
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demonstrate that systemic change in police culture, norms, and conduct is
necessary for the betterment of the collective.
C. Legislative Changes to Laws Involving a Disparate Racial Impact in
Criminal Justice
The full scope of legislation necessary to disrupt the racial impact of the
criminal justice system on persons of color is far beyond the humble trajectory of
this piece.220 "Over-criminalization, over-punishment, and discriminatory policing
and prosecution define the [biased and broken] contemporary criminal justice
system. 22' This affects daily policing activities, such as who police deem
suspicious and subject to Terry stops . . . ."2 22 "Law enforcement fits into a starkly
racialized justice system that disadvantages and targets people of color.2 23 Just after
1980, racial disparities increased dramatically in everything from arrests to
incarceration, largely due to the 'War on Drugs' initiated by the conservative Bush,
and Reagan administrations.224 Overall, from 1980 to 2008, the number of
incarcerated persons quadrupled from 500,000 to 2.3 million,2 25 with the United
that led to the corrective action in the first place; and finally that corrective action, like Brown v.
Board ofEducation, often does the work of white supremacy and white heteropatriarchy because the
legal process, the legal decision-making in the case of Brown, inoculates implicit norms embedded
in the remedial action from detection. Derrick Bell, The Interest-Convergence Dilemma and Brown
v. Board of Education, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 528-533 (1980). I use interest convergence theory to
make the case for data gathering that would benefit everyone with the added benefit of casting into
stark relief the intersectional demographic information surrounding police use of force cases as well
as the adjudications that surround them for purposes of both detection and remedy.
220 See generally Zach Newman, "Hands Up, Don't Shoot": Policing, Fatal Force, and Equal
Protection in the Age ofColorblindness, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 117, 153 (2015). The Sentencing
Project, along with other scholarly and advocacy projects, however, have made the case for
comprehensive policy and legal changes to reduce racial disparities and the use of fatal force in
policing. NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, BLACK LIVES MATTER: ELIMINATING
RACIAL INEQUITY [N THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19-20 (2015), available at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rdBlackLives Matter.pdf.
221 Newman, supra note 220, at 134.
2 22 Id.
223 Id at 135; see also Aliya Saperstein et al., The Criminal Justice System and the Racialization of
Perceptions, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 104, 106 (2014) ("As it currently operates,
the criminal justice system differentially targets and differentially punishes black Americans, in
particular, with similarly disparate consequences for their families and communities.").
224 Newman, supra note 220, at 135; see also Michael Tonry, Racial Politics, Racial Disparities, and
the War on Crime, 40 Crime & Delinquency 475, 475 (1994).
225 Newman, supra note 220, at 135. "At the turn of the century, one percent of the U.S. population
was in jail or prison and three percent were on parole or probation. Between 1982 and 1999, drug
sentences in federal and state prisons increased by 975 percent. Two-thirds of people of color in
prison are there for drug offenses. Black Americans are incarcerated at almost six times the rate of
white Americans. More than sixty percent of people in prison are people of color, and one in ten
black men in their thirties is in prison or jail on any day. One in three black boys will spend at least
some of their lives in jail or prison, and one out of three black males is under the criminal justice
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States now incarcerating twenty-five percent of the world's prisoners . . ." and
making America the most carceral nation in history.226 America's rates of
incarceration are so high that consensus exists between both Democrats and
Republicans that reform is mandatory. 22 7
Post-racialism, colorblindness, implicit bias anchored presumptions of
white innocence and black demonry, legal formalism that erases historical
contextuality and socio-economic material reality, and Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence "intersect to support the constitutional requirement of intent." 228
According to the Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, even if a neutral law has
a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a
discriminatory purpose. 229 Thus, "a plaintiff must have a 'smoking gun' of
discriminatory intent .... Where "a policy or law has a disproportionate and
disparate impact, it only matters whether that policy or law was designed with the
intent and purpose to discriminate." 23 1 The insistence on direct proof of
discriminatory impact is at odds with implicit bias, as well as its ubiquity. hnplicit
bias is the silent conspiracy in the room, whose power is so manifest it need not be
spoken and it is unquestionably shared.
As a partial corrective and immediate response to the impact of race on the
criminal justice system, legislators should proactively analyze racial impact
statements, which offer one method of measuring the projected impact that new
criminal justice laws and policies may have upon persons of color. In keeping with
system's control, such as on parole. In 2014, more black men were incarcerated and on probation or
parole than were enslaved in 1850. In addition, one third of people disenfranchised because of felony
convictions are black, which means that eight percent of all adult black Americans are
disenfranchised. Black adults are four times more likely to lose their voting rights than all other
adults. In Alabama, Kentucky, and Florida, one out of every five adult black Americans is unable to
vote." Id. at 135-36. This is due to racial violence facilitated by a "system that purports to be neutral,
post-racial, and 'colorblind,' based on the idea of increased formal access to civil rights for formerly
excluded populations." Id. at 138.
226 Newman, supra note 220, at 135; see also Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP,
http://www.naacp.org/pages/criminal-justice-fact-sheet (last visited Nov., 22, 2016).227 Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Black Family in the Age ofMass Incarceration, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 2015,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/10/the-black-family-in-the-age-of-
mass-incarceration/403246/.
228 Newman, supra note 220, at 139.
229 MCCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (stating, "But .'[d]iscriminatory purpose" . . .
implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the
decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."'
(quoting Pers. Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979))).
230 Newman, supra note 220, at 140.
231 Id. at 141.
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making race salient as a corrective to white supremacy, this information is vitally
important to legislators before they decide whether to enact a law.232
D. Using Implicit Bias Research to Screen Law Enforcement Candidates as
Part of the Application Process
Implicit bias research and cognitive testing might be used to screen
applicants in law enforcement. As the shooter bias studies demonstrate, implicit
bias is not just an idea. It is a cognitive imperative that leads to action, from
microaggressions to macroaggressions: people get shot. Research demonstrates
that shoot/don't-shoot training can reduce implicit shooter bias. 233 Law
enforcement officers in this study participated in a shooter simulation similar to
the one used by Correll. 234 Although they mistakenly shot unarmed black suspects
more than unarmed white suspects at first, the racial bias was completely
eliminated after extensive practice with the program.23 5 in another study,
"researchers concluded that while these officers exhibited bias in their speed to
shoot, their experience and training reduced bias in their decision to shoot."236
Possible explanations for the outcomes may be that when implicit bias is made
known, knowable, and salient, officers place greater attention on their explicit,
biased attitudes, thus overcoming the subconscious bias. Part of the privilege of
white heteropatriarchy is its invisible nature and its inherent claims of innocence
that inoculate it from detection, punishment, sanction, and correction. When white
heteropatriarchy is unmasked and laid bare, particularly through public shaming,
it is forced to reckon with itself. Like the video images of southern white police
officers water hosing civil rights protestors or the numerous films depicting Nazi
atrocities during the Holocaust, public shaming or bringing atrocities to the
forefront may incentivize correction. It may also provide another impetus to hide
and morph its operations. Nevertheless, research demonstrates that trainings can
reverse or mitigate the results. Extended further, this research should be used to
explore the possibility of screening devices as part of the application process for
law enforcement. Authorizing officers to use lethal force and arming them with the
means to do it, knowing that implicit bias research dictates that black bodies are
more likely to be shot than armed white bodies is irresponsible. Given the
empirical research on implicit bias, the continued authorization of law enforcement
to police bodies of colors, particularly with guns, without controlling for implicit
bias, is problematic at best. At least twenty-five percent of the population, if in fact
232 See Jessica Erickson, Racial Impact Statements: Considering the Consequences of Racial
Disproportionalities in the Criminal Justice System, 89 WASH. L. REv. 1425, 1425 (2014).
233 See E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police Officers'
Responses to Criminal Suspects, 16 PSYCHOL. SC. 180, 183 (2005).
234 Id. at 180.
235 Id.
236 GHANDNOOSH, supra note 220, at 16.
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implicit bias has not inflated the numbers of "innocent" Whites, can be entrusted
with a gun to police bodies of color, more than the number of people in college.
With respect to implicit bias screenings, measurements of bias are no more
arbitrary than LSATs or standardized testing. The possibilities of using implicit
bias research should be explored.
IX. CONCLUSION
In order to hide, obfuscate, and legitimize its operations, white
heteropatriarchy enlists the institutional power of the police and the courts. In the
case of unarmed shootings, police departments provide a platform to perform white
heteropatriarchy. The grand jury process legitimizes the performance. The weight
of white heteropatriarchy inverts order, reallocates the burdens of proof and
persuasion, and turns the investigation and grand jury proceeding on its head.
When it places its finger on the scales of justice, it inverts judicial order, such that -
predators emerge as preyed, villains become victims, and the murdered are
deserving of their own death. Because it is ubiquitous, omnipresent, and
entrenched, white heteropatriarchy necessitates the use of multi-disciplinary set of
critical analytical tools to unlock, unmask, and deconstruct its operations in order
to cast its function in sharp relief for purposes of judgment and correction. In the
case of implicit bias, scholars should explore the possibilities of using cognitive
testing to screen applicants in law enforcement.
Given this current moment of hyper-racism, typified in the meteoric rise
of Donald Trump as the Republican Party nominee for President, these rituals of
violence will occur with greater frequency, and if uninterrupted, will occasion the
collective loss of our humanity as well as a criminal justice system plagued with
diminishing moral authority. Given the enormous consequences, disruption of
white heteropatriarchy as an operative in law enforcement and the judicial realm
is mandatory.
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